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Abstract
In this thesis we formulate two theoretical models of corruption making two contribu-
tions to Economic literature. First, we formulate a model where economic agents (who
would want to work in the bureaucracy), heterogeneous in their public sector motivation
i.e. some of them would like to work in the bureaucracy who are the motivated agents
while others would not like to work in the bureaucracy. Second we formulate a model
with two competing governments where honesty is modeled as a function of bureaucratic
wage rate which affects the firm’s investment decision to invest in a given bureaucracy
of a government. The firm has a choice of investing in either of the two bureaucracies
dependent on its proximity to the bureaucracy. Both the above models are based on
aspects that are not previously covered in literature. In Chapter 1 we review relevant
literature on corruption and the various popular and well-cited models of corruption. We
then turn to psychological and organization literature to study motivation and then to
studies of competition between governments and its efforts to attract FDI. In Chapter 2
we set up the economic model with motivation and in Chapter 3 we set up the model
with competing governments and the efforts to attract FDI.
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Chapter 1
Bureaucratic Corruption: A
Review of Issues
1.1 Introduction
There are various studies which attest that there is a close link between bureaucracy and
corruption (see Ackerman 1975; Acemoglu and Verdier, 1998 2000). Though we focus in
this chapter on bureaucratic corruption we would also like to give the reader an overall
view on corruption.
We pose here eight questions that help the reader to get a picture on corruption: 1) What
are the causes of corruption? 2) Is corruption the outcome of government intervention?
3) Can corruption be dependent on market structure? 4) How does corruption affect
the investment climate of the economy? 5) How does corruption affect growth? 6) Does
corruption vary in the regions of the same country? 7) Can centralization of government
affect corruption? 8) Is corruption related to the legal system of the country? 9) Do
wealth inequalities determine investment?
In Section 1.2 we introduce corruption in bureaucracy and in Section 1.3 we answer the
above questions and establish a link between bureaucracy and corruption. In Section 1.4
we study how bureaucracy is a social structure and the characteristics of the individuals
working in it. In Section 1.5 we study the impact of bureaucracy as an organization on
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investments.
1.2 Bureaucracy and Corruption
Bureaucracy has been defined by Weber (1947) as an organization with “clearly defined
hierarchy of offices” and entire separation of bureaucratic officials “from ownership of the
means of administration” and is attributed to the “mission-oriented sector” (Besley and
Ghatak, 2005). The organizations that provide collective goods cohere around a mission
like the researchers who advance knowledge, doctors who are committed to saving lives,
judges to promote justice and soldiers to defend their country in battle. The benefits
and costs generated by mission-oriented production organizations are typically not priced
as seen in bureaucracies. Niskanen (2007) argues that bureaucracy has been a key char-
acteristic of “public sector administrations for all governments with extensive territorial
sovereignty” from “ancient kingdoms of Sumer and Egypt to the modern nation states”
(Niskanen, 2007, pp. 4). The modern day bureaucracy has been defined by Hegel (1976)
as an organization where it is expected that public sector officials will be independent from
external influences since they live off the fixed salary that is given by the state. Besley
and Ghatak (2005) argue that officials who work in the mission orientated sector will get
satisfaction or utility from working from attributes that do not necessarily have a market
value. However, experience demonstrates that bureaucrats do not always exercise their
authority according to Hegel (1976) and do not necessarily drive satisfaction from non-
market valued attributes as suggested by Besley and Ghatak (2005). One of the possible
reasons for the non-functioning according to ideological principles of a mission-orientated
sector is corruption. Normally, “mission oriented sector” becomes more vulnerable to
corruption since the people who are a part of the organization may decide to act dishon-
estly. “Bureaucratic corruption” refers to acts by public sector officials who may engage
in what are termed as “corrupt dealings” with the with the public or with the political
elite (Rose-Ackermann, 1998). Bureaucrats demand bribes from the public either to of-
fer a service or to speed up a bureaucratic procedure in the most common form called
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as “petty corruption”(Kaufmann,1997). A service that is not supposed to be available
may also be provided with a bribe. While carrying out tasks for the political elite the
bureaucrats may also extract payments.
1.2.1 Causes of Bureaucratic Corruption
In a more regulated economy bureaucrats have more power to abuse it. Collier(2000)
states four factors that caused the African countries (which are considered to be regulated
economies) to slide into corruption “over regulation of private activity, expanded public
sector employment, expanded public procurement, and weakened scrutiny” (Collier, 2000,
p.194). These corrupt activities were further encouraged due to complex economic control
regimes where corruption was seen as discretion plus monopoly minus the accountability
(Klitgaard, 1988).
Collier (2000) explains corruption to be both morally and economically wrong. Economics
based solutions to reduce corruption have resulted in offering incentives which attempt
to change the behavior of public sector officials. Dixit (2002) looks at the effects of
different incentive based structures have on the performance of public sector workers.
However incentives can differ from a society to the other, a corrupt society will always have
incentives that will make people corrupt leaving the society in high corruption equilibrium.
Aidt (2003) discusses the concept of self reinforcing corruption. When a lot of officials in
the society are corrupt the probability of giving and accepting bribes increases. In such
societies the choice of occupation is also dependent on which job provides them with the
most bribes or opportunity for bribes (Murphy 1991; Acemoglu 1995).
The concepts of “fair wages” 1(Akerlof and Yellen, 1988) which affects the behavior of the
civil servants has been examined by Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1997). The Corruption
index from Political Risk Services (International Country Risk Guide) has been used to
test the relationship between corruption and the number of variables which are related to
the ability and the desire of the civil servants to earn income from corrupt sources. Their
1if the wages that the workers receive is less than their conception of fair wage then they supply an
effort less than their normal effort
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pay variable is measured as the ratio of government wages relative to the manufacturing
wages.
The main empirical findings of the paper are that law and quality of the bureaucracy
are highly correlated with the civil service wages and so may have indirect effects on
corruption. Secondly, corruption index improves on the order of 1 point when there in
as an increase in the ratio of civil service to manufacturing pay from 1 to 2 in the cross-
country regressions for a sample of 25 developing countries. Thirdly, the relative pay has
no significant effects on “within country” regressions, which indicates that relative pay has
no contemporaneous effect on corruption. Fourthly the quasi-eradication of corruption
would require a relative wage which would be 3-7 times the manufacturing wage. When the
bribe level is low or the probability of detection is high then these findings are consistent
with “Fair wage-corruption hypothesis” (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 1997, pp 4).
1.3 Models of Corruption
The above causes of bureaucratic corruption outlined in above section discusses the in-
centives and disincentives existing in a bureaucracy. The models of corruption that we
now explain attempt to explain the level of corruption existing within a society.
Model A: Corruption and the Government
Centralization would mean that there is just one monopolist who sells the government
good, therefore if a customer wants two complementary permits he will have to bribe the
joint monopolist however in a decentralized system he will have to bribe two separate
monopolists. The corrupt official in a joint monopolist agency would ask for a bribe
inclusive of the price in such a way that the marginal revenue is equal to the marginal cost.
In an independent monopolistic agency system the bribes that are to be paid increase due
to the complementary nature of the government goods. An example in this context has
been given by Shleifer and Vishny (1993) who have compared inefficiency arising from the
corrupt system existing in communist Russia with that of post communist Russia. In the
communist Russia the central party used to collect bribes however in the post communist
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Russia there were different ministries, local level government who were collecting bribes.
Model B: Government Intervention is not characterized by mar-
ket structure
Government intervenes to correct the market failures, hence to facilitate the intervention
it requires agents who would implement policies, make decisions and collect information
(Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000b). This paper derives that the government intervention is
non monotonic with the per capita income of the country. When the output in a country
increases we see that the opportunity cost of intervention increases since the government
will have to withdraw agents from the productive sector.
This would imply that one way we could reduce corruption by having minimal government
intervention in the form of over - regulation of the economic activities which often benefits
politicians and bureaucrats (Shleifer et al., 2001). Opportunities of corruption are associ-
ated with discretionary powers involving transfer of large volume of assets from the public
to private hands. Kaufmann and Siegelbaum (1997) establish that though privatization
can lead to corrupt free economy we do simultaneously also need more competitive and
transparent methods of privatization.
Acemoglu and Verdier (1998) model explains that with many bureaucrats we see that
even by paying a small wage to the bureaucrat, corruption can be prevented. With many
bureaucrats corruption is sure to be prevented since all entrepreneurs can be inspected.
The wage above which the investor will invest is analyzed, hence even having a large
bureaucracy which is being paid low may retard investment. Instead of having a large
bureaucracy it may be more feasible to have some relatively dishonest bureaucrats and a
high number of honest bureaucrats. Hence, having government intervention with partial
corruption is more desirable. The model also suggests a U-shaped relation between per
capita income and the government intervention. The opportunity cost for diverting agents
from the productive sector to bureaucracy rises for richer countries with high per capita
income. Hence government intervention is less desirable.
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When all entrepreneurs choose good technology, the government would find it difficult
to raise taxes to pay for subsidies to the entrepreneurs using the good technology and
the wages for the bureaucrats. Hence when all entrepreneurs choose good technology,
the revenues from taxes will fall short again. It is required that some entrepreneurs
choose bad technology to act as the “tax - base”. Since output is being produced by the
entrepreneur hence a poor economy will produce less. Although it would appear that
corruption would affect entrepreneurs in the same manner as the investors, however its
effect on entrepreneurs is more pronounce since it changes the risks that are associated
with entrepreneurial activities. Rent-seeking activities tend to lead to reallocation of
talent if the rent seeking activities would yield higher returns than other activities. This
would affect growth when the most able entrepreneurs become rent-seekers (Murphy et
al., 1991, pp. 507-515). Entrepreneurs will not want to undertake projects which have
a longer gestation period as the public officials may have an option to collect rents from
the future earnings that are associated with risky investments.
Model C: Government intervention is characterized by market
structure
Rose-Ackerman (1975) studies the relationship between incidence of corrupt dealings in
government contracting process and market structures. The paper hence concentrates on
the relationship between the official and the briber who is trying to corrupt the official.
The author assumes that the high level policy maker defines the state preferences and the
handling of the contract is delegated to a lower level bureaucrat. Hence the bureaucrat
is in charge of the procurement. The bribe is dependent on the market structure which
can either be competitive markets, market with product differentiation and market with
bilateral monopoly. In a competitive market due to existence of a private market for
the good there is no cost advantage for the seller to sell to the bureaucrat. In a market
with product differentiation if the seller and the buyer of the good can bargain amongst
themselves, if the seller feels that he can extract the surplus fairly enough then he won’t
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engage in bribery. Hence the model is based on the relative bargaining strength of the
two participants.
Ackerman’s paper suggests that the amount of resources that are devoted to law enforce-
ment do not completely support the amount of corruption. The more fundamental factor
is dependent on the market structure; we can either have a market structure with product
differentiation or a market structure without product differentiation. In a market with
no product differentiation and many sellers, corruption can be easily avoided. Corruption
can be avoided if the government exactly knows what it wants and finds a large number
of sellers those are willing to supply it.
If the government purchases a good that is also sold on the private market then the state
will simply purchase the good at the price prevailing in the markets. Hence the sellers
in a perfect competition market regime will have no incentive to bribe the government to
obtain the contract since they would all sell privately in the market.
Model D: Does corruption have effects on growth?
Efficient government institutions foster economic growth. The institutions and the eco-
nomic variables evolve simultaneously, as the institutions affect economic variable, so do
the economic variables effect institutions. Milgrom et al. (1990) emphasized that an effi-
cient judicial system was required to enforce contracts in the economy. In the absence of
an efficient judicial system there would exist insecure property rights over patents, profits
and physical capital that may reduce the incentives to invest. Dishonest bureaucracies
may make the procurement of licenses very hard. It is also seen in such bureaucracies that
the public resources that are meant for building infrastructure that eventually increase
the productivity (total as well as marginal) of investment are diverted towards politicians
and bureaucrats private consumption .
Empirical work done by Mauro (1995) analyzes data based on Business International in-
dices on red tape, corruption and bureaucratic efficiency. The corruption data was based
on the degree of corruption involved in the business transactions. Mauro (1995) finds
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that corruption lowers investment and hence growth, summarizing some of his results he
finds that the judiciary system, corruption and red tape indices are closely related (their
simple average can be taken as a proxy). The author has labeled it as bureaucratic effi-
ciency. The degree of corruption is dependent on the judiciary system or the probability
with which the corrupt official taking a bribe is caught as explored in many theoretical
models. Mauro (1995) using his data set and his model shows that there exist very strong
association between political stability and bureaucratic efficiency. The author then rates
the countries according to this index. The author finds that 1) If Bangladesh had been
to improve its efficiency and integrity of its bureaucracy (by one -standard deviation in-
crease in bureaucratic efficiency index) we would see it will lead to increase in investment
rates by 5 percentage points. 2) Investment rate and corruption have a significant and
negative association between them. 3) On analyzing the relationship between economic
growth and institutional efficiency, it was found that bureaucratic efficiency and corrup-
tion are significantly associated with the average per capita GDP growth. 4) Expenditure
on education is less by the corrupt unstable governments. Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) pro-
pose that public investment as a ratio of GDP is strongly related to a corruption index
even when corrections were made for the levels of development and of economies and for
the availability of funds to finance large-scale projects. This observation is strongly sup-
ported by empirical results since the decision makers would want to collect more bribes
which would motivate them to direct the public expenditure through those channels that
would make it easier to collect bribes. This would causes a bias towards high-value and
large-scale projects instead of projects which add value, like maintenance expenditures or
decentralized small-scale projects.
Triesman (2000) in his paper analyzes that why are some countries considered to be more
corrupt than the others. As we discussed above that institutions can foster economic
growth and institutions and economic variables evolve simultaneously. The institutions
that we study here are: a) Religion, b) Code of Law, c) Whether the country was a
former British Colony, d) Political Stability, e) Democracy, f) Federal Structure, and,
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g) openness to trade. The author finds that: 1) Countries that have higher growth
rates and more efficient institutions will be less corrupt. 2) The corrupt official weighs
his financial cost which is the risk of getting caught and punished against the expected
benefits. The probability of getting caught is dependent on how effective the legal system
of the country is. 3) He also includes the role that religion and freedom of press play in
the cost of corruption.
Model E: Corruption reinforces Corruption
Esteban and Ray (2006) discuss that uneven investments in the economies may not be due
to “corrupt economies” but because unequal and poor economies would display greater
public misallocation. Public support is required by agents in the form of licenses, permis-
sions or public infrastructure to translate potential productivity in to economic reality.
To do so they lobby, agents who have a higher productivity would lobby harder but to do
so they also must have higher wealth. The aggregate level of wealth determines the extent
of inefficiency in the public decision (for a given degree of inequality). Higher degrees of
inefficiency is displayed by poor countries which makes it tempting to say that corruption
is more widespread in poorer economies. In several cases public efficiency is improved by
reduction in inequalities since the degree of efficiency in the public allocation of resources
is also dependent on existing inequalities in the distribution of wealth.
Model F: Corruption and Property Right Enforcement
The prevention of corruption and enforcement of property rights is very expensive proce-
dure. Hence socially optimal allocation may be less enforcement of property rights and
more corruption. Acemoglu and Verdier (1998) have assessed the enforcement of property
rights using a general equilibrium approach. They show that increasing the public sector
wages may also improve entrepreneurial investment by inducing better enforcement of
property rights. Kaufmann and Siegelbaum (1996) while they examine the link between
corruption and privatization, separate property rights into “cash flow rights” and “control
rights”. They hypothesize that corruption is correlated with control rights and also and
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the lack of professionalism in the civil service, lack of pay incentives as well certain lack
in the penalty , monitoring and enforcement process.
The conclusions that Acemoglu and Verdier (1998) derive are:
1. Property rights are more secure when there is a honest bureaucracy.
2. Returns to investment are lower, when the degree of corruption is high.
3. There is a trade off between allocation of talent and enforcement of property rights.
4. It is shown that this misallocation of resources does not make the government.
counter- productive however it is a feature of an economy where there are incomplete
contracts and incentive problems.
1.3.1 Corruption and behavior
The above section explains existing work done in corruption literature. We over here
slightly change our discussion and focus on a more qualitative aspect which is the charac-
teristic of an agent or something that is more innate that distinguishes an agent from the
other. We begin to look at how efficiency can be increased in the bureaucracy by intro-
ducing competition in a bureaucracy on a organizational level. We then look at behavior
of the individuals working in the bureaucratic organization.
Model G: Corruption affected by competition between bureau-
crats
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) developed a model of petty bureaucratic corruption which
took account of supply, demand and cost functions. The costs of bureaucrats include the
costs attached to providing services and considering whether the revenues from the bribes
have to be shared with others. The demand would refer to the competition amongst
the bribers. The bureaucrats from the supply side have a monopoly over the service or
they may compete with bureaus. The amount of bribes to be taken cannot be negotiated
openly by the officials given the nature of the deal. A bureaucrat may accept a bribe but
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may refuse without a further payment provision of contracted service, hence it becomes
difficult for the parties to ensure that the contract is enforced.
In Drugov (2010) competition is introduced amongst the bureaucrats. The firms would
invest in eliminating the negative externalities of production, and the bureaucrats admin-
ister the process of issuing license. The bureaucrats that are corrupt would give license
to the firms in exchange of a bribe. It is found that the competition regime will create
incentives ex-ante in nature and the ex-post allocation of incentives will be better with the
monopoly regime. Indian case has been referred to as the monopoly regime. The license
must be obtained from a pre-specified bureaucrat in this regime; hence, this bureaucrat
has a monopoly power over the applicants in his district. The Russian case is described
by the competition regime. Bureaucrats compete for applicants since any applicant can
request a license from any bureaucrat. Competition in public administration is often seen
as a solution to bureaucrat’s corruption; however there is no detailed design of it. Among
the techniques of fighting corruption Rose-Ackerman (1978, 1999, p.49) proposes “creative
use of competitive pressures within government”. Gioacchino and Franzini (2008) explain
that corruption can take 2 shapes: bribery and extortion, under asymmetric information
about the honesty of the bureaucrats, competition is effective in fighting extortion how-
ever it worsens bribery. Hence there can be faced a problem of trade-off where in trying
to make one better can worsen the other. By increasing competition (i.e. when each of
the agent is provided with more higher number of licenses) a bureaucrat can get more
bribes. Competition can work well when there is extortion in the model by endowing
every bureaucrat with as large as number of licenses as possible. Competition in bureau-
cracy should however be properly designed. A crucial aspect of it is considering how many
licenses can be allocated to each of the bureaucrat and how many licenses can each of the
bureaucrats manage.
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Model H: The choice of the agent to work in the Political or the
Private sector
Mattozzi and Merlo (2007) have used a dynamic model to describe the occupational
choice of a politician to work in the political sector or leave the public office and work
in the private sector. The agents can be heterogeneous in political skills or their market
ability. The authors have explained career politicians as those who get non-pecuniary
rewards from being in office while those with political careers leave their public office
before retirement and work just to increase their market wage. The model describes
when there is an increase in salary of politician the average quality of individual in the
office would decrease. In equilibrium the model proves the simultaneous existence of
political careers and career politicians2
Model I: Corruption based on individual’s perception of the en-
vironment
Sah (2006) construct a dynamic model, at each stage of which we have perceptions of the
players being influenced from a variety of factors such as experiences of oneself and the
others. It aims to predict the behavior of the individual and the group. The setting is that
of overlapping generation’s model. A principal theme of the paper is that an individual’s
perceptions of his environment are based mostly on his experiences. These perceptions
are based on “level of corruption” he encounters.
The perception would define whether the bureaucrat and the citizen choose to be corrupt.
These perceptions in turn influence the future choices of people. Hence in this dynamic
framework the author examines some of the properties: 1) how the levels of cheating and
corruption are affected by some of the economy’s parameters, 2) choices of the individual,
and, 3) the dynamic evolution in the economy of corruption and cheating. This dynamic
framework model explains that how in a country level of corruption can differ according
2What would attract career politicians are the non-pecuniary rewards that they derive from being in
office
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to the perception.
Model J: Corruption studied as a game of “gamble”
Multiple equilibria results have been derived in other theoretical models, one by Cadot
(1987) where he has constructed a model with corruption as a gamble, where the official
would face the risk of being reported and sacked by a superior officer. The Nash equi-
librium will be obtained under different information structure. He gives 3 conditions for
the officials to be corrupt lower degree of risk aversion, higher time discount rate and
lower wage rate. When corruption interacts at different levels of hierarchy it will lead to
multiple equilibria. When the general level of corruption in the bureaucracy is high we
have that probability of being caught also diminishes and vice versa.
Model K: Corruption dependent on belief formation
Sah (1988) in the paper modeled with overlapping generation’s corruption with intertem-
poral behavior, and in the belief formation have a Bayesian learning process. The agents
and the bureaucrats would start off with a subjective probability distribution and in the
process they meet agents who are corrupt or not. The corrupt ones would prefer to meet
the corrupt and the non corrupt would prefer meeting non - corrupt.
This is because of the strategic complementaries arising in the model, where it would be
more profitable for one agent to do something that the other agent is doing. Strategic
complementaries would give rise to multiple equilibria. Hence their beliefs will be formed
on the basis of whether they are meeting the corrupt or the non corrupt agents. The
formation of these beliefs based on past experiences can lead to a culture of corruption
giving rise to multiple equilibria. Bardhan (1997) also suggest that the multiple equilibria
of corruption would depend on the number of officials who are corrupt. The marginal
benefits for a honest official will decrease as the number of corrupt officials will increase
giving rise to three equilibria: in the first stable equilibrium all the agents are honest,
the second when all are dishonest and third equilibrium will be unstable lying in between
these two equilibria. Whether we move towards the dishonest or the honest equilibrium
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will depend upon the behavior of the marginal office. An interesting comparison can be
derived with two economies having same parameters may end up with different levels of
corruption (dependent on the belief formation in that economy), hence the steady state
to which each of the economies will settle to is dependent on its history.
Model L: Corruption and Reputation Model
Every organization: firm, country builds on a reputation, if it happens to build on a bad
reputation the future generation may have to bear the bad consequences. Tirole (1996)
constructed a model with an overlapping generation’s framework where we have where
an organization’s collective reputation is dependent on the individual reputation. Such
collective reputations have persistence effect that is to say that reputation is passed on to
generations. Tirole (1996) further developed the model by taking persistence of corruption
in a overlapping generation model, by introducing one time shock on the equilibrium;
hence exposure to the corrupt activities would be independent of the corrupt acts in the
past.
1.4 Bureaucracy: A Social Structure
The earliest design of an organization came up in the form of “bureaucracy” associated
with the German Sociologist and philosopher Max Weber. The characteristics of a We-
berian bureaucracy were 1) Job Specialization: the jobs were broken down into simple,
routine and well-defined tasks. 2) Authority Hierarchy: positions were in a hierarchy of
authority, where each of the position was under the authority of the other. 3) Employment
and Career: selection and promotion took place on the basis of technical qualifications.
4) Recording: Decisions and administrative acts were recorded in writing. 5) Rules and
Procedures: Reliable, predictable behavior was ensured from the side of employees since
it was subject to rules and procedures. 6) Impersonality: rules and procedures were im-
personal and applied to non-managerial and managerial employees alike (Huczynski and
Buchanan, 2007, pp. 489).
Even though Weber gave an ideal organization design in the form of a ‘bureaucracy’
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which is associated with legitimate authority we see that the usage of the term has ac-
quired derogatory implications among the public and the media: especially when it comes
against red tape and obstructiveness in any aspect of organizational life. We now under-
stand the reasons for inefficiencies in the bureaucracy. Three elements will have to co-exist
for the existence of corruption. Someone must have discretionary powers, to be so one
must have power which includes authority to design the regulations. There must be eco-
nomic rents associated with these powers, such that the specific groups can capture those
rents. The judicial or legal system would offer a low probability of being caught. The
first two reasons create incentives to act dishonestly. As the government of states grew
larger during the modern period modern bureaucracies also arose and especially following
the Industrial Revolution. The arbitrary exercise of power by authoritarian regimes was
taken over by bureaucracy. The logic assembly line brought to the factory, the same logic
was brought to the government. The efficient undertaking of large complex tasks was
made possible under the hierarchical authority.
Do the perceptions of an individual matches the organizational reality given the needs
of such a social structure? We answer the question posed, by discussing the personal-
ity, perception, and motivation of an individual working in this social structure. These
characteristics are built by learning, communication, punishment, values attitudes and
interest. We first look at the attributes of learning, communication, punishment and val-
ues attitudes and interest and see on how they build the personality, perception, need for
power, status, leadership and motivation of an individual.
1.4.1 Learning
Learning would mean change, but change that is relatively permanent in nature (Robbins,
2003). This change is brought about since the individual has experienced something.
Learning results in different actions and behavior, since it is continuous and automatic
process. It therefore links the individual to the social world. In organizations learning
increases the capacity of everybody to contribute to the process. Goals are met more
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effectively by the organizations. The organization is emancipated through “behavior,
purpose, vision and values” (Mullins, 2007). Management practices are thus affected by
learning theories including induction of new recruits, delivery, design of job training and
the system of payments, how performance is evaluated by supervisors and feedback is
provided and the creation of learning organizations.
1.4.2 Punishment
American psychologist Burrhus Frederic Skinner (1904-90) developed the idea of Skinner-
ian conditioning involves the association of the behavior with the consequence. The most
controversial method of behavior modification is dependent on the occurrence of an unde-
sirable behavior which involves the deliverance of an unpleasant consequence dependent
upon such behavior (Huczynski and Buchanan, 2007).
We explain 4 systems of management Likert (1967) which have been sophistically put by
(Singh, 2010). Here punishment is used as a reform mechanism in the following ways:
1. Exploitative Authoritative: managers have no trust in their subordinates, and they
motivate the managers using punishment and fear and decision-making is limited
to the top.
2. Benevolent Authoritative: Managers using this system have trust and confidence
in their subordinates. They get sometimes opinions and ideas for problem solving
from their subordinates. Motivate their subordinates using sometime punishment
or rewards.
3. Consultative Authoritative: Managers do not have complete trust and confidence
on this system. Usually get ideas and opinions from their subordinates, motivate
sometime with punishment and sometime with reward.
4. Participative Decision Making: Managers allows or encourage employees to partici-
pate and share in organizational decision making. Punishment is not seen as a way
to motivate subordinates.
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1.4.3 Values, Attitudes and Interest
Values lay the foundation for the understanding of motivations, attitudes, personality and
perceptions hence essential for understanding organizational behavior. Individuals enter
an organization with preconceived notions of what is true and what is not true (Robbins,
2009). Direct consequence of it is that they imply certain behaviors or outcomes that are
preferred over others.
1.4.3.1 Source of Attitudes
Attitudes determine behavior since they are linked with personality, perception and mo-
tivation. Specific influence is exerted on the person’s response to objects, situations and
people. Culture, language and mores influence attitudes. An understanding of the func-
tions of attitudes is important for the study of organizational behavior. They also help
predict work behavior (Jain, 2005).
1.4.3.2 Type of Attitudes
The variety of the job, the challenge attached to it and the gratifications that accrue
to the workers are all attached (Morse, 1953). Following on what Morse (1953) says we
limit our attention to three main types of job-related attitudes. The positive or negative
evaluations that employees hold about aspects of their work environment are tapped by
the job-related attitudes. The Likert theory (1967) is based upon 1) how efficiency in
group would maximize motivation, and, 2) how for achieving group goals motivation can
be channeled. Based on the hierarchical structure the individual is tied to its organization.
Typically, there are three primary attitudes that are of concerned to us i.e. job satisfaction,
job involvement, and organizational commitment.
1. Job satisfaction: It is regarded both as the general attitude of the individual
towards the job as well as the satisfaction that the individual gets from specific
dimensions of the job like supervision, co-workers, promotion opportunities, the pay
and the work in it. The degree of satisfaction is derived from how well the outcomes
are fulfilled (Kalleberg, 1977). A person with a positive attitude will be the one who
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has greater job satisfaction while a person with negative attitude will be dissatisfied
with the job. (Saari and Judge, 2004).
2. Job Involvement: has often been seen as a predictor of work-related outcomes
ethical behavior and professional commitment (Leong, Huang, & Hsu, 2003); psy-
chological ownership for performance in organization (Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004).
3. Organizational commitment: expresses an individual’s orientation toward the
organization by tapping his or her loyalty to, identification with, and the degree
of involvement in the organization. Individuals who express high commitment see
their identity as closely attached to that of the organizations. Hence organizational
identification is antecedent to organizational commitment (Gemmiti, 2007).
According to Rosenburg and Hovland (1960) there are three different kinds of responses
from which we can infer attitudes: 1) Cognitive Response: these responses reflect the
information or the perception about the attitude object. 2) Affective Response: from
these responses we can infer feelings or attitudes toward the attitude object. 3) Cona-
tive Responses: these are behavioral inclinations, actions, commitments, intentions with
respect to the attitude objects.
1.4.4 Personality
Personality can be defined as the stable set of characteristics and the tendencies that
determine the differences and the commonalities in the psychological behavior (Maddi,
1980).
All personality psychologist agree that psychologies related to personality are usually co-
herent and consistent (Cervone and Shoda, 1999).
Often people’s experiences and actions are interconnected which makes personality co-
herent leading to coherence in social behavior and experiences. Due to the coherence in
social behavior, personality is often linked with organizational behavior.
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Bureaucratic Personality forms a part of personality dimensions
A bureaucratic person would value orderly processes in the organization and impersonal
and formal relationships, conformity, rules and subordination. The respect for authority
is based upon respect for organizational rules and regulations and is not total and blind
(Merton, 1957).
1.4.5 Perception
In individual decision-making in organizations a crucial role is played by perceptions, by
affecting the decision as well as the quality of it. Our actions are influenced by how we
perceive the physical and social environment. Our behavior is explained by terms like
‘motive’, ‘intentions’, ‘reasons’, ‘purpose’ and ‘desires’. Hence human behavior becomes
a function of how we perceive events and other people (Huczynski and Buchanan, 2007).
Rogers’ Self Theory approach (1951) is described as phenomenological to personality and
perception. For him behavior is the result of immediate events and how they are perceived
and interpreted by the individual. This approach emphasizes the characteristics of the
self. Hence also referred to as the “Self theory” of personality because behavior of the
individual is best understood from the internal frame of reference of the individual himself.
1.4.6 Communication
To the understanding of organizational behavior communication is central since it affects
performance in the organization and career prospects. Everything significant that happens
in an organization involves communication. Hierarchical networks, variation in power
and status, job structures and nature of employment contracts in organizations prevent
communication. Communication is regarded as a major problem by many managers
(Buchanan, Claydon and Doyle, 1999).
1.4.7 Power, Authority and Leadership
Organizations though they are rational entities they do not often strictly follow their own
well defined system which leaves scope for politics and power play. For organizations to be
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managed in a proper way it is necessary to understand the dynamics between authority,
politics and power. We see in bureaucracies that these concepts are inter-dependent.
Authority is related to the position in an organization, hence confined and dependent on
the organizational structure (Ashraf, undated). Power is linked with the individual based
on its individual understanding. It is also a critical dimension of leadership (Astley and
Sachdeva, 1984; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995). Bureaucratic organization sometimes
raise incompetent individuals to the position of leadership, it is often seen that such
leaders would often build alliances and coalitions (Ashraf, undated).
1.4.8 Motivation
Lay people and scholars have their own definition of motivation. Technically, the term
motivation can be traced to the Latin word movere, which means, “to move”. This
meaning is evident in the following comprehensive definition: A motive is an inner state
that energizes, activates, or moves (Berelson and Steiner, 1964). It directs or channels
behavior toward goals. The key to understand motivation, it appears, lies in the meaning
of, and relationship between, ‘needs’, ‘drives’, and ‘goals’ (Maslow, 1943). The needs,
drives and goals can be defined as pressures and influences that would sustain, channel
and trigger human behavior.
Motivation can be explored from the three related perspectives:
1. Goals: Wealth, status and power trigger behavior that is directed towards this
pursuit. Motivation is viewed in terms of the desired goal or outcome.
2. Decisions: The individual’s choice of goals is influenced by the cognitive-decision
making process.
3. Influence: this factor looks at motivation as a social influence process like when
the managers want to motivate their employees on time.
Motivation can be distinguished as extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. Extrinsic
motivation links the employee’s monetary motives to the goals of the firm. Pay for per-
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formance is an ideal incentive system (Osterloh and Frey, 2000). Extrinsic motivation is
strongly influenced by opportunism where individuals are independent of any rules. How-
ever intrinsic motivation works through immediate need satisfaction. Intrinsic motivation
would be indispensable when the external incentive lead to undesired consequences.
If identification with the work or intrinsic job satisfaction has to be aroused then the
job must in itself provide sufficient skill, variety, complexity and challenge to engage the
abilities of the worker.
Intrinsic motivation would involve people doing an activity because they derive sponta-
neous satisfaction from it. However extrinsic motivation would require that the satisfac-
tion comes from not the activity in itself but rather the extrinsic consequences.
Motivation can also be characterized as distal and proximal. The distal factors
are linked with the utility of the person of doing the task and the person’s perception of
how much effort to be applied for effective performance (Gagne and Deci, 2005). When
there are complex activities that require sustained and complex efforts then the proximal
factors of self regulation and self monitoring are critical for performance.
1.4.8.1 Motives
A motive be aimed at stimulation having a social basis that is activated by the environ-
ment (Huczynski and Buchanan, 2007). Some of the more important motives associated
with organizational behavior are power, achievement, and affiliation. In addition, secu-
rity and status are also important secondary motives. The two motives that are easily
attached to bureaucrats are a) Power Motives that are derived from the need to manip-
ulate other or the drive for superiority over others (Adler, 1927b). Status Motive can be
defined as the motivation derived from how the person is relatively ranked in a group,
organization, or society.
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1.4.9 Job Characteristics Theory
We now explain how in work-motivation theories motivation is treated.
1.4.9.1 Hackman & Oldham (1980)
According to Hackman and Oldhman (1980) the most effective way of motivating indi-
vidual is through the optimal design of jobs. High internal work motivation is focussed
on in their theory of job characteristics which bears considerable relation to autonomous
motivation. Jobs should be designed such that internal work motivation can be increased
such that they (1) provide variety (2) afford discretion and considerable freedom to the
employee (3) meaningful performance feedback is provide. The following equation gives
us easy way to understand the variables affecting the total motivating score.
1.4.9.2 Goal Setting theory
This theory is related to the decision making process of an individual also regarded as the
process theory of motivation. Locke (1968, 1975) argued that one of the main motivational
technique is goal-setting. The goal theory has established four main propositions that
have been well supported by research. 1) Challenging goals: high levels of performance
are achieved by them. 2) Specific Goals that lead to higher levels of performance than
having vague goals. 3) Participation in goal setting improves performance by increasing
commitment to the goals. 4) For effective goal achievement knowledge of results from
past performance is also necessary.
1.4.9.3 Hierarchy of Needs or Deficient Theory of Motivation
Maslow (1943) gave the hierarchy of Needs or Deficient Theory of Motivation. In this
theory needs are arranged in a definite sequence of domination i.e., the higher order needs
do not dominate unless the needs of lower order are reasonably satisfied. Lower/primary
order needs includes basic physiological needs and to feel safe and secure. The social
needs and needs attached to esteem and self-actualization are higher or secondary needs.
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1.4.9.4 Achievement Theory of Motivation
According to the McClelland (1961) achievement theory of motivation we have three basic
social needs: affiliation, power and achievement.
 Need for achievement: The need for a person to advance , achieve and attain
realistic, challenging goals would be “achievement motivated”.
 Need for power: A person who has the need to be influential is “authority moti-
vated”.
 Need for affiliation: A person motivated toward interaction with other people is
“affiliation motivated”.
McClelland observed that as we advance in the hierarchical structures the need for power
increased as compared to the need for power and achievement. People at the top ceased
to be motivated by this drive.
1.4.9.5 Elton Mayo (1945)
Mayo (1945) is known for his “Hawthorne Experiments” which provided for the basis for
the studies in organizational design, organizational development, participation, leadership
and motivation. The workers were motivated by psychological and social factors rather
than just the work, pay conditions and physical working conditions.
1.4.9.6 Equity theory of J. Stacey Adams (1963, 1975)
This theory is based on our perceptions of fair treatment. The theory argues that per-
ception attached to unfairness creates tension which which makes people more motivated
to act. People compare their outputs and inputs and use subjective judgment to com-
pare the outcomes (the rewards in the form of pay and recognition) and contributions (in
the form of time, effort and ideas). Wider organizational and social context is ignored
by the theory in two ways. The first would concern the basis at which we make social
comparisons which can be extremely varied, the second concerns systematic inequities in
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the capitalist economies. The perception of equity holds when same treatment is received
from the employing organization while being exploited by those in power.
1.4.9.7 Other Motivational Theories
For people to be intrinsically motivated the feeling of competency and autonomy are
important as suggested by the Cognitive Evalution Theory. Intrinsically motivating ac-
tivities are optimally challenging (Danner and Lonky, 1981).
Self Determination theory (Gagne and Deci, 2005) talks about two types of motivation:
autonomous and controlled motivation. Autonomy would involve having an experience of
choice. According to Dworkin (1988) autonomy would mean to endorse ones actions at
the highest level. Intrinsic motivation would be an example of autonomous motivation.
Controlled motivation requires using extrinsic awards to induce controlled motivation.
However both autonomous and controlled motivation is intentional.
Intrinsically motivated which is propelled by the people’s interest in the activity is au-
tonomous. Extrinsic motivation however can vary in the degree to which it can be con-
trolled versus autonomous. Those activities that are not found to be intrinsically moti-
vating will be extrinsically motivating so that their enactment would depend upon the
perception of an immediate response between the motivated behavior and the consequence
that is desired like any tangible reward or implicit approval. This type of behavior would
be typically extrinsically motivated.
Self determination theory also distinguishes between amotivation (i.e. the lack of moti-
vation) and motivation. Motivation requires intentionality and amotivation involves not
having an intention to act (Gagne and Deci, 2005).
The concepts that have been described above of those of autonomous motivation, amo-
tivation and controlled motivation are connected to the person’s relation to the activity.
These motivational variables are predicted from both aspects of the job and work envi-
ronment and how they affect the social environment.
The Self determination theory focuses on the relative strength of controlled versus au-
tonomous motivation however most work motivation theories focus on the total amount
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of motivation needed.
Action Regulation Theory: Hacker(2003) and a number of other scholars have used this
theory to examine motivation in work organizations and other settings. The theory uses
the concept of goals and also emphasizes the mechanisms that keep people effectively
focused on goal directed action. The theory has become crucial in work design since it
explains the various stages of preparing for action. This includes orientation on the task,
redefining the task in to a goal and then evaluating and implementing it.
1.4.10 Treatment of Motivation in Organizations
Our discussion has pertained with understanding “motivation” and how work motivation
theories discuss it. We now look at how motivation is treated in organizations. Our
discussion follows from the management literature.
Klehe and Anderson (2007) compare maximum performance of what people can do and
typical performance of what they will do. They find that motivation rose significantly
under the maximum performance condition, with the persistence of effort and the level
and direction of it increasing significantly. The average motivation of participants in an
experiment on 138 participants that were assigned to perform an internet search task was
higher in maximum rather than typical performance conditions.
Milne (2007) discusses that performance, interest and self-motivation is positively affected
by means like rewards and recognition programmes within the organization. Team based
incentives can also encourage and support positive outcomes.
Moynihan and Pandey (2007) focus on the formative role of socio-historical context. They
examine the role that is played by organizational factors in shaping public sector moti-
vation. Education and professional membership in organization would greatly determine
public sector motivation. The length of organizational membership and red tape also
determines public sector motivation. Reform efforts and hierarchical authority will have
a positive relationship on public sector motivation.
Siemsen et al. (2008) build on motivation-opportunity-ability framework as a driver to
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knowledge-sharing behavior. With it is also studied a constraining-factor model (CFM)
which determines the knowledge sharing that occurs. Macro level insights are provided
by the CFM with respect to how bottleneck in MOA (motivation-opportunity-ability)
variable can be removed, which helps in setting related policies.
Manolopoulos (2008) advance the understanding of the relationship between organiza-
tional performance and motivation. In the public sector of Greece extrinsic and intrinsic
motives that could be given to public sector employees was identified. It was identified
that in Greece extrinsic rewards were more likely to be provided.
Ritz (2009) studies the links between institutional factors, attitudes of the employee,
the measures taken by the management and the performance in the organization. They
empirically test the effects of job satisfaction, public sector motivation and organiza-
tional commitment on perceived performance in the federal administration of Switzerland.
Performance-oriented management tools and higher individual and organizational perfor-
mance have been focussed on in the management reforms in the public administration In
the Swiss federal administration it was found that the efficiency related to reduction in
cost and decision making is positively related to the relationship between commitment,
motivation and job satisfaction.
The variables that we discuss above that affect the public sector employee’s performance
have however not been formally incorporated in the wage contracts. The two incentive
problems that we have in contract formation is that of hidden-information and hidden
actions. The first problem would refer to a situation where we have that the employee
has private information about the unwillingness or inability to take on certain tasks.
This information would be about some relevant characteristic of the employee. In our
model the employee (the bureaucrat) is differentiated by the level of motivation hence
the employer or the government is not informed about the motivation of the agent. The
second problem that arises in contract formation is that whether the employer can see
what the employee does that how much effort is put by the employee. Mostly in public
sector, the employer (the government) does not know whether the employee is honest
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dishonest. Hence in the contract formation between the bureaucrat and the government
we have adverse selection and moral hazard both as incentive problems. The literature
on contract theory and corruption does not talk about this aspect of hidden-information
in contract design by the government for the bureaucrat. In Macchiavello (2008) a public
good is produced by a worker and there is heterogeneity amongst the workers in terms
of their public sector motivation. The quality of the public good produced in the public
sector determines the utility of the agent in the private sector. The quality of the public
good is in turn dependent upon agents who do not behave opportunistically in the public
sector and the incentives given in the public sector. The wages given in the public sector
which the author has quoted as public sector wage premia, if high enough would motivate
the workers to be honest. The model also emphasizes that the provision of “on the job
incentives” would vary systematically with private sector wages.
1.5 Impact of Bureaucracy as an organization on In-
vestments
The incentives in organization like the bureaucracy also are linked to the magnitude of
investments in the bureaucracy. An entrepreneur would favor to invest in an economy
where his investments give him the expected returns. To understand reasons for investing
and not investing in an economy we first look at tax competition literature and how
governments compete for investments.
1.5.1 Tax Competition
The literature on competition amongst governments has dealt with mainly tax competi-
tion. However recent tax literature also deals with developing two sided markets where we
have sellers and buyers. We first in the following section develop on tax competition lit-
erature then talk about foreign direct investment and competition amongst governments.
A lot of empirical research investigates the link between fiscal decentralization and growth.
The evidence linking the both is mixed. There are two mechanisms linking the two. Hat-
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field (2006) shows that tax competition will increase the returns to savings by raising
the post tax return on growth leading to growth in an endogenous growth model. Koen-
thenbuerger and Lockwood (2008) assess how diversifying portfolio and rate of return
arbitrage as two relevant motives for investing outside in a multi jurisdiction endogenous
growth model. A demand for portfolio diversification is created by assuming that there
are independent shocks to production in each of the states. However in the standard tax
competition model the diversification motive is absent. A rate-of-return differential is the
only driving force taken into account in a standard tax competition model. Capital flows
to other jurisdictions when there is a higher capital tax rate in the other jurisdiction and
expands the tax base therein. Kotsogiannis and Serfes (2011) look at the tax competition
model when the equilibrium outcome is dependent on the firms and shoppers (two sided
market). The jurisdictions compete by providing public goods and they levy taxes to
attract the firms and the shoppers in a model of horizontal and vertical differentiation.
The intensity of tax competition is affected by the interaction of two markets and when
the strength of the interaction is weak and ineffective then then the minimum tax policy
is effective. They compare in their paper two US towns A and B, A has a better selection
of restaurants and shopping areas than B. This high shopper’s traffic in town A attracts
even more business. This is because town B has a higher fee tax to start up a business
and a poorer relative public infrastructure.
This example helps us understand the investments in different jurisdictions. Even though
there may be a change in tax policies it does not result in an exodus of business since
the firms also benefit from market access and government spending. In most of the tax
competition literature firms and consumers are immobile; two sided markets have only
recently been studied. In a two sided market the two set of agents interact through a
platform or an intermediary and the outcome of the other set of the agent is dependent
on the decision of each set of the agent (Rysman, 2009).
In the theoretical literature on tax evasion collusive corruption has been extensively stud-
ied (Besley and McLaren, 1993). The incentives differ when we have collusive corruption
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as to when there is extortion. If for example the customs inspector has information about
the value of the firms’ imports, then the inspector could ask for a bribe from the firms’
management giving an offer to reduce the overall tariff liability. The firm has no incen-
tive to report. Klitgaard (1988) also describes this form of ‘collusive corruption’ in the
Philippine tax system; where this form of corruption is also called arreglo (arrangement).
For example if the tax-payer pays half of the correct taxes then the rest of the amount is
paid as a bribe to the tax collector.
1.5.2 Foreign Direct Investment
Alguacil et al. (2010) discuss how a set of policies should be developed by the host
government that not only focuses on the inward FDI promotion but also on the economic
and political framework. FDI through technology transfers and managerial expertise has
a positive impact on productivity growth (De Mello, 1997).
The question then that arises is the FDI exploited more efficiently by countries with better
macroeconomic environments and institutional environments or whether the presence of
the local conditions is mainly responsible for growth. The literature provided by endoge-
nous growth theories has stressed the growth enhancing effect also come from mechanisms
like quality of human capital, level of infrastructures, macroeconomic and institutional
background and the degree of financial and trade openness.
Literature by Demekas et al. (2007) sees the effect on foreign inflows and economic
performance of the macroeconomic environment. Policies along with ‘institutions’, play
a key role in development and also attracting FDI. Easterly (2005) talks on how ‘deep-
seated social arrangements like property rights, rule of law, legal traditions, trust between
individuals, democratic accountability of governments and human rights”, are reflected
by institutions (Easterly, 2005, pp. 19). They set the general macro-environment for
the economy. Reduced investment related costs such as corruption related costs is also
responsible because of good institutions.
Corruption non-uniformly affects horizontal investments which are aimed at sales to the
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local market and vertical investments which are made to access low factor costs for export
sales. Using Swedish firm level data it is seen that corruption reduces the probability that
the firm invests. Horizontal investments get deterred by corruption to a larger extent
(Hakkala et al., 2008). They show that impact of corruption may be asymmetric in two
aspects : 1) The probability with which a firm chooses to invest is affected, and, 2) it also
has differential effect which depends on the size of the type of investment.
Corruption deters foreign direct investment by acting like a tax on investments, increasing
the insecurity about costs (Sheliefer and Vishny, 1993). Corruption is viewed as tax on
profits since the activities involved with corruption like payment of extra costs by the
foreign investor to get license or government permits decreases the expected profitability
of investment (Bardhan, 1997). Wei (1997) showed that corruption would slow Foreign
Direct Investment, since due to the general uncertainty induced by the arbitrariness in
corruption investors in general dislike to invest. He found that ‘the effect of uncertainty
on FDI is negative, statistically significant and quantitatively large”’ (Wei, 1997, pp. 14).
If the uncertainty had to increase from the level of Singapore to that of Mexico, then
it would be equivalent to raising the tax rate by 32 percentage points on multinational
firms.
Smarzynska and Wei (2000) by using firm level data in Eastern Europe and former Soviet
Union show the probability of inward foreign investment in host country is reduced by
corruption in host country. Business meet the most common form of financial corruption
where for each of the following: tax assessments, import and export license, exchange
controls, police protection and other public services bribes are expected.
Mlambo (2005) identifies the various factors that constrains foreign direct investments
in Southern African development community (SADC). Growing perception of corruption
makes the region unattractive for foreign investments. The cost of business transaction is
added on by corruption which leads to inefficient economic outcomes. Wei (1997) found
that major disincentive to foreign investment was caused by corruption in host countries.
The most promising policies would be attract FDI inflows by protecting and enforcing
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property rights, reducing excessive regulation, reducing corruption and improving the
quality of bureaucracy (Mlambo, 2005).
1.5.3 Competition amongst Governments
To attract investments in their jurisdictions there is competition amongst the governments
at both national and sub national levels (Charlton, 2003).
In case of incentive competition the governments bid against each other to attract mobile
capital. Positive sum game hypothesis believes that the efficient mechanisms for compet-
itive markets are the incentives that the government intervention is designed to achieve
through industry policy objectives. Even if there is no competition amongst jurisdictions
governments do offer incentive to keep investors mobile. In foreign investment literature
it is seen that there is an evidence of “following the leader” or clustering (Charlton, 2003).
The reason behind this being that the firms do not wish to take “first mover risk” in an
uncertain new location (Ziet and Valdes, 1989).
“Leviathan models” also propose that due to tax competition welfare also improves since
government officials are forced to reduce wasteful expenditure. In the absence of tax com-
petition the size of the government will be excessive and hence tax competition improves
welfare (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980).
Oates (2003) sums up the paradigm of incentive competition by saying that less than
efficient levels of local services may result due to tax competition. Officials may hold
spending below (optimal) level to attract business investment. Governments may pay too
much for their investment projects leading to competition for incentives.
The competition for incentives can also lead governments to pay too much for their invest-
ment projects which would lead to inefficiently high subsidization of international firms
at the expense of domestic country.
Firms will be more wanting to reduce the “depth” of investment in any location when there
is incentive competition enabling them to capitalize on incentive offers more frequently
and enabling the firms to move easily (Fierro-Duran and Reisen, 1990). Competition
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plays a major role in driving incentive deals resulting in intensive bidding wars between
countries that are similar or have similar regional governments (Oman, 2000).
Regional governments or countries having decentralized forms of governments at the sub-
national levels that contribute to international and intra-national competition and deliver
incentive packages (Akuoko-Frimpong, 1990). Looking at a case study from the Brazil-
ian industry there exist competition at several levels of government- regional, state and
federal. From the case studies of Brazilian automobile sector which is the most impor-
tant sector of Brazilian economy it is seen that its growth has tripled from 1990 to 2000.
Competition amongst ASEAN countries for FDI has been the key factor for the grow-
ing investment incentives. There is a potential to increase effectiveness of incentives and
also reduce wasteful expenditure when transparent and comprehensive accounting prac-
tices are introduced. For nations it is “individually optimal” to offer incentives exceeding
the efficient levels hence creating a “prisoners dilemma” situation in this form of strate-
gic competition The anticipation of a potential effect of the “prisoner’s dilemma” makes
coordination amongst the jurisdictions justified (Charlton, 2003).
The coordination amongst the jurisdictions is difficult since governments do not reveal
the true nature of incentive deal. Some of the incentives distort economic decisions (con-
tributing to outright corruption) or also escalating bidding wars amongst the governments
competing against each other. “Opaque” subsidies are generally criticized since it is diffi-
cult to value it correctly and lead to unpredictable revenue losses and can be very costly
at large. Due to cooperation amongst governments transparency is increased and positive
welfare outcomes are yielded. Improved reporting standards must be achieved by creating
and enforcing collective policies and informational disadvantage is also reduced that the
governments have in negotiating with the investor firm.
The OECD countries to reduce “harmful tax competition” also adopted the “import
prohibition” approach. “Import prohibition” is a term that has been defined by WTO
agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) which is mainly applied to
the area of export. Prohibited subsidies are those that are most damaging to trade.
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Oman (2000) notes that investment competition has the potential to generate corruption,
graft and other rent seeking behavior. The opportunity for corrupt behavior is reduced
when there is less discretion and greater accountability on the part of the government
officials.
The above discussion leads to a need of economic reforms. It is also seen that the economic
reforms like market liberalization and privatization lead to a rise in corruption. These
reforms often respond to the vested interest of the corrupt elites; however the absence of
well-implemented economic reforms will lead to greater amount of corruption3
Robert Leiken wrote that market and administrative reforms may even become coun-
terproductive when corruption is systemic. Economic activity can lead to loosening of
government controls. By exacting new ‘fees’ in other areas bureaucrats have known to
compensate for lost revenues (Kaufmann,1997).
Some of the anticorruption efforts have been described below: The tax inspectorate insti-
tution of Philippines called the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) was revamped and tax
reforms were implemented. Argentina’s social security reforms (ANSES) are examples of
institutional reforms that have been very effective. Corrupt personnel were immediately
fired, new control systems were put in place, and there were modern incentive and per-
formance assessment systems that were assigned. Exemptions were significantly reduced
and tax rates were simplified reducing the discretion and incentive to reduce bribes.
Macroeconomic stabilization which essentially include policy reforms like broad market
liberalization, constituency build up that favors’ competition, removing the discretion to
provide soft credits and subsidies (Kaufmann, 1997).
However with macroeconomic liberalization we should also have microeconomic liberal-
ization like creating moderate, uniform and simple tax rates, regimes with determined
enforcements and without exemptions; reforms in the budget and the government which
includes establishing financially sound and transparent expenditure and revenue mecha-
nisms; institutional reforms like eliminating redundant agencies and ministries; reforms
3given the reforms are competitive and transparent.
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in civil service and legal reforms.
“Setting up an improved civil service pay system, with adequate salary incentives and
enforceable penalties for malfeasance, is also critical. Countries that have established a
system of rewards for civil servants that is competitive with the private sector have also
reduced corruption” (Kaufmann, 1997,pp 128).
Hence we end at this note where we see that for effective foreign direct investment in a
region we need an efficient bureaucracy.
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Chapter 2
Motivation, Private Sector Wages
and Corruption: An Equilibrium
Approach
2.1 Introduction
Bureaucratic Corruption has been modeled and discussed widely in the corruption liter-
ature. This paper relates bureaucratic corruption and public sector motivation.
The model and the analysis is based on the questions below:
1) Is the occupational choice of working in a bureaucracy dependent more on non-
pecuniary payoffs received working in the bureaucracy or the wages received in private
sector?
2) Do higher wages given to agents in the public-sector attract non-motivated agents; if
the wages in private sector are sufficiently low then what leads them to behave honestly?
Bureaucratic corruption has been studied as an intervention by the government to correct
market failures (Verdier and Acemoglu, 1998); the incidence of corrupt dealings in govern-
ment contracting process and the market structures (Ackerman, 1975); corruption based
on perception of the agent which is influenced by his experiences (Sah, 1996); bureaucrat
acts as a monopolist of the good say a license or provides permit (Shleifer and Vishny,
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1993); corruption is taken as a gamble when the official faces the risk of being reported
and sacked (Cadot, 1987); reputation that a firm, organization, country inherits from the
past (Tirole, 1996); is corruption result of weak property right enforcement (Acemoglu
and Verdier, 1998).
Our approach is different as it analyzes what makes an agent to pick up a private sector job
as compared to bureaucratic job or vice versa. Agents have different degrees of motivation
for public service, the more motivated ones would want to work in the bureaucracy while
the less motivated/non-motivated ones would work for a wage. If they get a private sector
job, then they work for a private sector wage rate or work dishonestly in the bureaucracy.
Besley and Ghatak (2005) in a different setup cast light on how changes in the productivity
of the private sector would affect the optimal incentive schemes in any mission oriented
sector. We discuss how the extrinsic benefits of working in the bureaucracy affect the
private sector productivity. There have been ongoing discussion on how the pay-setting
in public sector bureaucracies would respond to the private sector,our model discusses
this aspect of wage setting in bureaucracies.
Our model is so designed to shed light on the contract formation between the employee
and the employer. The two incentive problems that we have in contract formation is that
of hidden-information and hidden actions. In our model the employee (the bureaucrat)
is differentiated by the level of motivation hence the employer or the government is not
informed about the motivation of the agent. The second problem that arises in contract
formation is that whether the employer can see what the employee does that how much
effort is put by the employee. In our cast the employer does not know whether the
employee is honest dishonest. Hence in our contract formation between the bureaucrat and
the government we have adverse selection and moral hazard both as incentive problems.
The literature on contract theory and corruption does not talk about this aspect of hidden
-information in contract design by the government for the bureaucrat. In Section 2.2 we
lay out the basic model. In Section 2.3 we discuss the equilibrium and in Section 2.4 we
discuss the policy choices.
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2.2 The Basic Model
We have a static economy which consist of continuum 1 of risk -neutral agents. Each
agent can work in private sector or work as a bureaucrat. Agents are differentiated
by their level of motivation (added payoff received when working in the bureaucracy),
with the convention that θ = 0 represents non-motivated agent. The level of motivation
is uniformly distributed over [0, 1] and is private information. We let n be the mass
(fraction) of bureaucrats in the public sector, and let (1 n) be the mass of private sector
agents. x is a set of bureaucrats relative to total population that are acting honestly
and are the ones that are most motivated. wb is the wage rate that is paid to the
bureaucrat. Each bureaucrat is given control over an exogenous amount of resources
g. These resources could be diverted by the bureaucrat increasing the utility by g. In
this case it would not contribute towards the output from bureaucracy. We assume that
λg is benefit of a good bureaucrat for the private sector. wp is the private sector wage
rate determined endogenously. q 2 (0, 1) is the exogenous probability with which the
opportunistic behavior of the bureaucrat is detected. y is the private sector output.
When detected the bureaucrat would lose the wage and be dismissed. G is government
expenditure by the government such that G=n(g+wb), g of these resources are allocated
to each bureaucrat ng are total resources allocated to the bureaucracy and nwb is the
total wage bill.
Preferences
All agents are assumed to be risk neutral with a utility function that is additively separable
in wages (from the private sector and the bureaucracy) and motivation.
Since motivation is uniformly distributed amongst the agents the utility of the bureaucrat
is given by equation (1) and the utility of the agent working in the private sector is given
by (2)
utility(b) = max
[
(wb + θ), (wb + g + θ)(1  q)].....(1)
utility(p) = wp ....(2)
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The first equation explains that the bureaucrat can either be honest or dishonest. If the
agent is honest and motivated he gets a payoff of (wb + θ). If the agent is dishonest and
works in the bureaucracy he would get an expected payoff of (wb+g+θ)(1 q). The payoff
of the dishonest agents is (wb + g + θ) if not caught; hence the utility of the dishonest
agent is (wb + g + θ)  q(wb + g + θ). If the agent works in private sector he would get a
payoff of wp.
Order of play
Stage 1: The government sets a public sector wage rate wb, n the size of the bureaucracy,
and g are the resources allocated to each bureaucrat. This then determines G =n(g+wb)
the size of government expenditure. The limit on G is given by G* such that it satisfies
G = n(g + wb
∗
) where g are the maximum resources allocated to each bureaucrat and
wb
∗
are the wage rates at which all bureaucrats are honest.
Stage 2: Two professions are offered to each agent. One can become government employee
(bureaucrat) or can become a private sector agent.
If the agent decides to work as a bureaucrat he can either be honest or dishonest. If the
agent is honest the payoff of the agent is:
pihonestagent = (w
b + θ).
If the agent is dishonest the payoff of the agent is :
pidishonestagent = (w
b + g + θ)(1  q).
If the agent works in private sector the payoff of the agent is:
piprivatesector = w
p.
Stage 3: The agent applies for work. The government chooses a number n, and hence
gets a proportion who will be honest to a proportion who are not honest, in line with the
pool of applicants. The rest of applicants who are not selected to bureaucracy go to the
private sector.
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Private Sector Output
If we have in the bureaucracy honest agents who are also motivated such that x =
x(wb, wp, g, q, n); where x is total number of honest bureaucrats that the bureaucracy
employs. Hence the private sector output comes from the private sector employment to
the power α, multiplied by the value of the government spending by honest agents gλ
times x.
Private sector output =
[
x(wb, wp, g, q, n))gλ
]
[1  n]α
Private sector wage rate is determined endogenously.
wp = α
[
x(wb, wp, g, q, n)gλ
]
[1  n]α 1
We see from the equation that wp is a function of x (honest agents who are more highly
motivated) and x is dependent on wp i.e to say the number of motivated agents in the
bureaucracy is dependent on private sector wage rates.
2.2.1 Switching Point/Cut Off Level
θh is the cut off the point for a honest motivated agent to work in the bureaucracy. For
the market to be in equilibrium an agent with lower than θh should prefer working for
wages and agents with higher motivation should prefer bureaucracy. Fig (2.1) describes
the switching point. Point A is a switching point/cut off level where the wage function
for private sector and wages for honest motivated agents intersect
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Figure 2.1:
Multiple Switching Points/Cut Off Levels
When the bureaucratic wage rate paid to the agent is less than the bureaucratic wage
rates where all agents are honest we observe multiple switching points. Point B gives us
the cut-off point θh which is the intersection for wages for honest motivated agent and
the wage function for dishonest agent. Point A gives us the cut-off point θl which is the
intersection for wages for dishonest agent and the wage function for private sector. The
interval θl, θh is given by intersections A and B in the (Fig(2.2)). In this case we see that
at point B (Fig(2.2)) the honest motivated bureaucrats with motivation in the interval
[θh, 1] would reduce and we would have dishonest low motivated agents in the interval
[θl, θh]. At point B we have the intersection for wage function for dishonest agent and for
the honest agent. Beyond pt. B the agent gets a higher utility from being honest and
motivated.
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Figure 2.2:
2.2.2 Agent’s behavior
In the above diagrams in Fig(2.1) and Fig(2.2), for a given wp, wb, g and q and motivation(θ)
we have agents preferring to work in private sector or as dishonest honest agents in the
bureaucracy. In this section we analyze how the choices of the agents change when one
parameter changes with respect to other keeping other parameters constant.
In Fig(2.2) as we increase wb the wage lines for dishonest and the honest bureaucrats
become steeper. We will see that the size of the dishonest agents working in the bureau-
cracy remains constant however the size of private sector reduces and the size of honest
bureaucracy increases.
As we increase wp the private sector wage line shifts parallel up the size of dishonest
agents working in the bureaucracy would fall and private sector agents would increase
and the size of honest bureaucracy remains constant.
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In Fig(2.3) we see that as we increase bureaucratic wages the agents who are honest and
decide to work in bureaucracy increase (wp = 1.35, q = 0.3, g = 0.7)
Figure 2.3:
As we increase bureaucratic wages those wanting to work in the private sector would fall.
The agents in bureaucracy working dishonestly would rise and then remain constant and
the agents working honestly in the bureaucracy would rise.
The kink at A is given by the intersection of private sector wage line and the wage line for
public-dishonest agents at minimum motivation. The kink at B is given when the wage
line for the dishonest agent and the wage line for public-honest agents would converge to
a point where they intersect each other.
However the utility of agents working in the private sector before the kink at A is higher
than working dishonestly in bureaucracy, the utility of the agents working in the private
sector after the kink at A starts falling. The utility of the honest agents working in the
bureaucracy after the kink at B is much higher than working in the private sector.
In Fig 2.4 we see that as we increase private sector wages the agents who are honest and
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decide to work in bureaucracy remain constant and then with further increase in private
sector wages the agents working in the bureaucracy would fall. The public dishonest agents
would also remain constant and then start falling. The agents working dishonestly in
bureaucracy however start falling before the agents who work honestly in the bureaucracy
would fall (q = 0.2, g = 0.2, wb = 0.5)
We explain how we get the kink points:
The kink at B corresponds to the kink at C. It is when in Fig(2.2) we parallely shift the
private sector wage line, those who would want to work dishonestly in bureaucracy would
start falling and the private sector workers would start increasing.
The kink at A corresponds to the kink at D hence those who would want to work honestly
in the bureaucracy would start falling and there would be no more dishonest agents
working in the bureaucracy. After the kink at E everybody wants to work in the private
sector. Hence for an increasing wage rate in the private sector the utility of the dishonest
Figure 2.4:
agent to work in the bureaucracy starts falling before the utility of the honest agent to
work in bureaucracy. Hence for given private sector wages we will have only honest (and
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those who are also highly motivated) agents working in the bureaucracy.
2.3 Equilibrium
An equilibrium consists of a set of values of x, wp and y given the government’s choice of
n, g and wb. We formally define equilibrium in our model as values of x̂ and ŵp such that
(x̂ , ŵp) solve for the equations x = f(wp) and wp = f(x). In Fig(2.5) we see 4 segments
of x as a function of wp.
Segment A: For low levels of wp, working in the private sector is unattractive and all
workers prefer to be in the public sector. Those with low motivation would act dishon-
estly if recruited, but those with higher motivation would act honestly. With everyone
preferring to work in the public sector however only a fixed proportion of those will act
honestly, giving a vertical relationship between the number of honest bureaucrats and the
private sector wages.
The number of honest applicants (and those who are also highly motivated) in bureaucracy
remain constant till a given wage rate in the private sector.
Segment B: When private sector wages increase, working in the private sector becomes
attractive for workers with no motivation, because these would have the least utility from
public sector. On further increasing the private sector wage rate we have fewer dishonest
applicants in the bureaucracy.
Segment C: no more applicants who would be dishonest as bureaucrat find public sector
more attractive than the private sector i.e. all applicants would be honest. Even as wp
rises (in this range )there are more applicants than the jobs, so x can be vertical.
When we have all agents that apply to the bureaucracy are honest we see that as we
increase private sector wages the number of honest bureaucrats remain constant.
Segment D: Private sector is attractive even to relatively high motivation . Can’t hire n
workers; as wp rises, x falls. As the private sector wages further increase honest bureau-
crats would leave the bureaucratic job to work in the private sector.
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We thus see 4 segments of x as a function of wp:
x̂ = n
(
1 + wb + g   w
p
1  q
)
for 0  wp < (wb + g)(1  q)
= n
1 + wb   g(1 q
q
)
1 + wb + g   wp
1 q
for (wb + g)(1  q)  wp < g1  q
q
= n for g
1  q
q
 wp < (wb + 1  n)
= (wb + 1  wp) for (wb + 1  n)  wp  (wb + 1)
(2.1)
Eq(2.2) gives us marginal product or real wage equation.
ŵp = αx(wb, ŵp, g, q, n)gλ(1  n)α 1 (2.2)
Eq(2.3) gives us total output.
ŷ = x(wb, ŵp, g, q, n)gλ(1  n)α (2.3)
Equilibrium number of honest bureaucrats and private sector wages is given by the in-
tersection of the set of equations given by Eq(2.1) and we plot them in Fig(2.5) and in
Fig(2.6) below.
Since x is a linear function in wp, wb, g, q, n; ŵp is an increasing function of x.
x̂ is concave function of wp.
Hence at a low private sector wages we have some bureaucrats to be dishonest, at a
medium wage rate we have more applicants in the bureaucracy to be honest. At a higher
private sector wage rate we have all applicants in the bureaucracy to be honest (those
who are also highly motivated).
As the private sector wages further increase honest bureaucrats would leave the bureau-
cratic job to work in the private sector.
In Fig(2.5) if the wp line pivots (eg because wp has risen) there will be single intersection
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Figure 2.5:
Figure 2.6:
with the line and a unique equilibrium. However if Segment B is flatter as in Fig(2.6) we
have multiple equilibrium.
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In the best equilibrium we have more number of honest agents and higher private sector
wages which in turn keep the less motivated, dishonest workers away from the bureaucracy.
Single Equilibrium will hold when:
1
∂x
∂wp
> w
p
x
(Slope of wage function)
∂x
∂wp
< x
wp
x̂ = n
1+wb g( 1−q
q
)
1+wb+g  wp
1−q
∂x
∂wp
=
n(1+wb g 1−q
q
)(1 q)−1
(1+wb+g  wp
1−q )
2
< 1
αλg(1 n)α−1
Substituting and solving we have 2wp < (1 + wb + g)(1   q) at the corner point. The
utility of being dishonest and working in the bureaucracy is greater than twice of the
utility obtained working in the private sector.
We now study the impact of each of the parameters on the wage lines and the equilibrium.
In Fig(2.7) for a very low q we have that no agent would want to work in the bureaucracy.
(The x as function of wp(q = 0.1) coincides with the y-axis). As we increase q further
on we have an equilibrium with a higher private sector wage rate and honest agents (and
those who are also highly motivated). Increasing q further on we have an equilibrium
where all applicants are honest for a bigger range of private sector wages, on increasing
the private sector wages further bureaucrats would leave the bureaucratic job to work
in the private sector. If utility from working honestly in the bureaucracy is higher than
the utility from working dishonestly in the bureaucracy, and the utility from working in
private sector is greater than working dishonestly in bureaucracy then nobody would want
to work dishonestly in public sector.
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Figure 2.7:
Proposition 1: When the opportunistic behavior of the dishonest bureaucrat goes unde-
tected (i.e.probability of being caught is zero) no-one working in the bureaucracy will
be honest. For q < g
wp+g
as there is increase in q the number of honest agents in the
bureaucracy will increase, for q > g
wp+g
(where q ! 1) as there is increase in q the number
of honest agents in the bureaucracy will remain constant, since once we get to the point
x = n any further increases in q will not change the number of honest bureaucrats
Proof:
We first establish results on the number of agents.
Bureaucrats would work honestly in the bureaucracy when the utility from being honest
and motivated is greater than what the agent gets if he is dishonest and works in the
bureaucracy i.e. (wb + θ) > (wb + θ + g)(1− q).
If q = 0 (the probability with which the opportunistic behavior of the bureaucrat is
detected) then this would fail to hold (wb + θ) < (wb + θ + g)(for any g > 0).
Hence, (wb + θ) > (wb + θ + g)(1− q) (Substituting for θ = 1).
q(wb + 1 + g) > g
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For q < g
wb+1+g
no-one is honest.
Hence for 0 < q < g
wb+1+g
no honest agent would work in the bureaucracy.
Segment A :
x̂ =
(
1 + wb + g   g
q
)
n
So ∂x̂
∂q
= ng 1
q2
> 0
Segment B:
x̂ = n
1+wb g( 1−q
q
)
1+wb+g  wp
1−q
Using implicit form of equation we have: Z = x̂(defined from Ls) - x̂ (defined from inverse
wage line) 0)
∂Z
∂wp
∂wp + ∂Z
∂q
∂q = 0
∂wp
∂q
=  
∂Z
∂q
∂Z
∂wp
∂Z
∂wp
= (1 + wb   g(1 q
q
))(1 + wb + g   wp
1 q )
 2(1  q) 1   (αλg(1  n)α 1) 1
∂Z
∂q
=
g
q2
(1+wb+g)  wpg
q(1−q) (
1
q
+1)+ w
p
(1−q)2 (1+w
b)
(1+wb+g  wp
1−q )
2
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which gives us
∂wp
∂q
=  
g
q2
(1+wb+g)  wpg
q(1−q) (
1
q
+1)+ w
p
(1−q)2 (1+w
b)
(1+wb+g  wp
1−q )
2
1
(1+wb g( 1−q
q
))(1+wb+g  wp
1−q )
−2(1 q)−1 (αλg(1 n)α−1)−1) >
0
∂wp
∂q
=  ∂x
∂q
∂wp
∂x
Now we know; ∂w
p
∂x
= 1
(1+wb g( 1−q
q
))(1+wb+g  wp
1−q )
−2(1 q)−1 (αλg(1 n)α−1)−1
Therefore, ∂x
∂q
=
g
q2
(1+wb+g)  wpg
q(1−q) (
1
q
+1)+ w
p
(1−q)2 (1+w
b)
(1+wb+g  wp
1−q )
2
∂wp
∂q
< 0 for ∂x
∂q
> 0; ∂w
p
∂x
< 0 when (αλg(1  n)α 1) 1 < n(1 + wb   g(1 q
q
))(1 + wb + g  
wp
1 q )
 2(1  q) 1
which is the condition for a multiple equilibrium and here we have an inferior equilibrium.
∂wp
∂q
> 0 for ∂x
∂q
> 0; ∂w
p
∂x
> 0 when
(αλg(1  n)α 1) 1 > n(1 + wb   g(1 q
q
))(1 + wb + g   wp
1 q )
 2(1  q) 1
which is the condition for a single equilibrium.
Segment C and Segment D
For q  g
wp+g
,the curve changes shape and we have a curve defined by Segment C and
Segment D.
Therefore, ∂x
∂q
= 0, once wp > g 1 q
q
; because
x = n for g 1 q
q
 wp < (wb + 1  n)
x = (wb + 1  wp) for (wb + 1  n)  wp < (wb + 1)
Q 2 D
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Lemma 1: We now prove the results on the private sector wages that for q < g
wp+g
as there
is increase in q the private sector wages will increase for q > g
wp+g
as there is increase in
q private sector wages will be constant.
Proof in the appendix
Implication 1: On the inferior segment(i.e. Segment B), as we increase q the probability
of being caught the private sector wages will fall.
Implication 2 : The change in x the number of honest agents(and those who are also
highly motivated) w.r.t to q the probability of being caught is dependent on change in
private sector wages w.r.t change in x .
∂x
∂q
=
∂wp
∂q
∂wp
∂x
The change in private sector wages w.r.t to changes in q is proportional to change in x
the number of honest agents(and those who are also highly motivated) w.r.t q and change
in private sector wages to x
∂wp
∂q
= ∂x
∂q
∂wp
∂x
Hong Kong and Singapore both have been very successful examples of credible reforms in
civil service by setting up an independent anticorruption agency to control corruption by
law enforcement. In 1974 the Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) was
set-up. The ICAC was given the right to recommend administrative and legal changes
to reduce corrupt incentives (Klitgaard 1988). Surveys of the public that were carried
out between 1977 and 1994 indicated that the perception of corruption by the public had
reduced (Ackermann 1999). Singapore government party, People’s Action Party which
assumed power in 1959 made control of corruption a priority. It strengthened the powers
of an existing Corrupt Practices Investigations Bureau (CPIB). In the case of Philippines
51
penalties and the rewards were altered. Rewards in the form of transfers, promotions,
cash prize and praise was given for good performance the perpetrators of corrupt acts
were punished and also led to dismissal of officers. Singapore is now considered to be
clean government complying with Western standards. Public policies have controlled
most corruption in the government. The above case studies describe how with an increase
in the legal standards there is an increase in the number of honest agents and then the
number of honest agents remain constant.
Proposition 2: If for a given slope of x as a function of wp as λ the unit benefit of a honest
bureaucrat on the private sector increases the private sector wages will increase (∂w
p
∂λ
> 0,
in this case we shall have a single equilibria )
If for a given slope of x as a function of wp, we have that as we increase λ the unit benefit
of a honest bureaucrat on the private sector the private sector wages will fall(s.t. we have
an inferior equilibrium where (∂w
p
∂λ
< 0)).
Proof in the appendix
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In Fig(2.8) for a low g we have more honest bureaucrats (keeping the q constant) and
higher private sector wages. On increasing g the number of honest agents would fall and
the private sector wages also fall. At a very high g we have no honest applicants in the
bureaucracy.
Figure 2.8:
Proposition 3 : As g increases, the allocation of resources to the bureaucracy the private
sector wages will increase if and only if (1+wb) > 2g 1− q
q
. As we further increase g private
sector wages will decrease for (1 + wb) > wp.
Proof in the appendix
Carnis (2010) writes about developing ways to understand the functioning of bureaus and
determining the consequences of allocation of resources. Due to the impossibility of eco-
nomic calculation and ill-defined ownership rights, leads to absence of market prices with
53
the bureau which makes it impossible to evaluate production (Mises, 1983(1969,1944),p.
52). This makes it impossible to correctly allocate resources leading to overuse or inef-
ficient use of resources. Since the bureaucrat has no ownership rights over the resources
agents may sometimes may loose the incentive for inefficiency. According to Carnis (2010)
due to absence of an economic calculation the bureaucratic organizations are character-
ized by errors, furthermore these bureaucratic organizations lack the means to correct
them easily. Due to an increase in these organizations it leads to ’error clusters’ (Huls-
mann, 1998, p. 11). It leads to spread of distortions in all interconnected markets in the
economy. The author concludes by expressing a need for work on the internal dynamics of
bureaucracies and private sector. We in the above proposition prove how much resources
should be allocated to the private sector such that they are used efficiently and lead to an
increase in private sector wages. On further increasing the allocation can lead to it being
used inefficiently.
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In Fig(2.9) for a low wb we have an equilibrium with less number of honest(those who
are also highly motivated) bureaucrats and low private sector wages. As we increase wb
there are greater number of honest applicants and an equilibrium with higher number
of honest agents and private sector wages. On increasing the wage rate further we have
an equilibrium with higher honest applicants and higher private sector wages. However
when this high bureaucratic wage rate is paid we see that honest (and those who are also
highly motivated) do not leave the bureaucratic jobs to work in the private sector.
For a high bureaucratic wage rate (wb = 0.9), applications by agents with motivation
θ 2 (0, 1) would work honestly in the bureaucracy.
We see when θ = 0 , wb > wp > (wb + g)(1  q); hence agents with no motivation as well
would like to work in bureaucracy.
Figure 2.9:
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Proposition 4: When private sector wages are low, and hence working in the private sector
is unattractive, all workers prefer to be in public sector.
As we increase wb, s.t. 0  wp < g 1 q
q
the number of honest agents in the bureaucracy will increase till wp = g 1 q
q
(for θB =
wp   wb).
For wp < (wb + 1   n), increasing bureaucratic wages the number of honest agents will
remain constant.
For wp > (wb + 1  n) the number of honest agents will increase.
As the bureaucratic wage rates increase the private sector wages will increase.
Proof in the appendix :
The above proposition is related to the work done by Besley and Mclaren (1993) where
they evaluate in their model alternative payment schemes in the presence of corruption.
The problems of moral hazard is considered where taking of the bribes cannot be observed
and adverse selection since all the agents cannot be observed as being dishonest or honest.
Three wage regimes have been identified by them, the reservation wage is the wage that
the tax inspector can earn elsewhere. The efficiency wage, which is the wage that deters
bribery and solves the moral hazard problem. The government could also pay a wage that
is below the reservation wage and called capitulation wage at which only the dishonest
would become the tax inspectors. The developing world when undergoing a structural
adjustment programme faces a dilemma on how much to pay its civil servants. Tanzi
(1990) hence argues that the policy of wage cutting “is likely to increase the inefficiency
of public sector employees, especially at a time when the public sector is expected to play
a larger role in restructuring the economy” (p. 16). The authors compare the three wage
regimes, they base their argument on tax paying capability tax payers. There are θ such
tax payers that have income above the threshold at which a tax must be paid. For θ=0.1,
capitulation wages are always preferred to efficiency wages as there is a choice only between
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reservation and capitulation wages. The decisive factor is the size of y (the probability of
meeting dishonest agent) for the given q. For a low y, hence low dishonesty the best wage
regime is to have reservation wages. However when y increases capitulation wages are the
best response to the existence of corruption problems whenever the government wants to
raise revenues. The authors evaluate the wage regimes when the value of θ increases to 0.5.
Efficiency wages are preferred when q is low and y is high, since it makes sense to deter
corruption as monitoring is effective on dishonest inspectors. Highest revenues are yielded
with capitulation wages when y is high however it is accompanied by poor monitoring.
Capitulation wage regime is best chosen by countries where the tax revenue relative to
total GNP is low. They then evaluate the case when θ=0.9, in this case efficiency wages
play a greater role as compared to both capitulation and reservation wages. With a
increase in proportion of tax payers who are willing to pay taxes efficiency wage regime
is optimal since the increase in efficiency wages winds up in the hands of the government.
In our model the government chooses n and wb. The government can choose to pay a
reservation wage in Segment A and B leading to a mix of honest and dishonest agents.
Besley and Mclaren(1993) examine that if only capitulation wages are paid we would have
only dishonest agents working in the bureaucracy. However we predict using our model
that there would be some honest agents since they obtain utility from being motivated.
In segment C the government could pay an efficiency wage however we examine further
that paying higher bureaucratic wage like the “efficiency wage” may not be optimal.
US policy from 1960’s has been to achieve similarity in pay of the federal employees and
the private sector workers. President Kennedy agreed that a wage differential between
the federal government and the private sector should not exist and action should be taken
in order that “federal pay rates be comparable with private enterprise pay rates for the
same level of work.”(Smith, 1976, pg. 181). The Postal Service and Federal Employees
Salary Act of 1962, was enacted to achieve a comparable pay for the federal workers
and the private sector workers. More recently Chile has been a leader in introducing
competitive pressures in the public sector. Reid (1992) explains in his paper on Chile
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made systematic efforts to improve incentives for its central government employees. 80
per cent of the employees stayed in the public sector while the rest 20 per cent left the
public sector to get jobs in private sector.
We also examine that in the inferior segment i.e. Segment B we see that as q and λ
increases private sector wages will fall. We understand this using the centralization form
of corruption in countries. Centralization would mean that there is just one monopolist
who sells the government good, therefore if a customer wants two complementary permits
he will have to bribe the joint monopolist however in a decentralized system he will have
to bribe two separate monopolists. The corrupt official in a joint monopolist agency would
ask for a bribe inclusive of the price in such a way that the marginal revenue is equal to
the marginal cost. An example in this context can be given for Russia (see Shleifer and
Vishny (1993)) where the Communist Russia had a centralized system of Corruption. In
this case if we increase q it would disrupt the centralization as the honest bureaucrats
would sell the good at the price assigned by the government resulting in a higher tax
revenue to the government however it will lead to the firm (or the entrepreneur) paying
a higher price for the government good which may result in it paying lower wages to its
employees.
2.4 Policy Choice
Fig (2.10) shows the wage needed to ensure that n bureaucrats are willing to work in the
bureaucracy and to act honestly. This is given by the kinked frontier ABC.
We find the minimum motivation for the least motivated agent such that the agent is just
indifferent between working dishonestly in the bureaucracy and the private sector.
(wb + θ̂ + g)(1  q) = wp
θ̂ = w
p
1 q   wb   g
At this minimum level of motivation the utility the agent gets from being honest is just
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Figure 2.10:
bigger than utility obtained from being dishonest.
Hence we need wb + w
p
1− q − wb − g > (wb + w
p
1− q − wb)(1− q)
wp
1− q − g > wp
wp > g 1− q
q
wb = min(g 1− q
q
, wp + n− 1)
Hence at a wage rate wb = g 1− q
q
all post will be filled by honest agents(in the segment
AB).
For an increasing bureaucratic and private sector wage rate given by the relation wb =
wp + n− 1 all post are filled (in the segment BC).
We solve for the value of n at the kink point B given by the intersection of segment AB
and BC in Fig(2.10).
g 1− q
q
= wp + n− 1
) n = wb + 1− wp
) n = g 1− q
q
+ 1− gλn(1− n)α
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We want to maximize the net private sector output (y) given by private sector output less
(wb + g)n.
In Fig(2.10) the net private sector output is given by: Gross private sector output - cost
of public sector , hence we have curve with a lower peak as given by the net private sector
output.
Case 1:
When wb = g 1 q
q
y = (x(wb, wp, q, n)gλ)(1  n)α   nwb   ng
y = xgλ(1  n)α   ng 1 q
q
  ng
dy
dn
= gλ(1  n)α   αxgλ(1  n)α 1   g 1 q
q
  g
dy
dn
= gλ
[
(1  n)α   αn(1 n)α
1 n
]
  g
q
d2y
dn2
=  2αgλ(1  n)α 1 + α(α  1)ngλ(1  n)α 2 < 0
Case 2:
When wb = wp + n  1
y = (x(wb, wp, q, n)gλ)(1  n)α   nwb   ng
y = (x(wb, wp, q, n)gλ)(1  n)α   n(wp + n  1)  ng
dy
dn
=  αgλn(1  n)α 1 + gλ(1  n)α   (wp + 2n  1)  g
dy
dn
=  2n+ 1  g + gλ(1  n)α (1  n
1 n
)
+ n
1 nαngλ(1  n)α 1(α  1)
d2y
dn2
=  2  gλ(1 n)α 1(1 + 2α) +ngλ(1 n)α 2(α  1)(1 +α)  2αgλ(1 n)α 2 n
1 n < 0
d2y
dn2
in both above mentioned cases is a concave function hence as n! 1, dy
dn
! 0.
60
Figure 2.11:
In the above Fig(2.11) OB is the gross private sector output, OC is the net private sector
output and OD is the increasing cost of public sector.
As we increase x the productivity per private worker increase since the number of private
workers fall, which gives an inverted-U relationship. The cost of public sector in increasing
and a quadratic function given by (wb(x) + g)n where x = n.
2.4.1 Optimal Bureaucratic Wage Rates
Proposition 5: If we have x = n, the derivative of net private sector output wrt wage is
negative, and so the net private sector output is higher with some corruption than with
none.
Proof:
We have y = xgλ(1− n)α − nwb − ng
∂y
∂wb
= ∂x
∂wb
gλ(1− n)α − n = 0
Is given by the bureaucratic wage rate that the government would like to pay its bureau-
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crats.
The equation for number of honest agents in Segment B is:
x̂ = n
1+wb g( 1−q
q
)
1+wb+g  wp
1−q
∂x
∂wb
= n
[
g
q
  wp
1−q
(1+wb+g  wp
1−q
)2
]
< 0
∂y
∂wb
= n
[
g
q
  wp
1 q
(1 + wb + g   wp
1 q
)2
]
gλ(1  n)α   n < 0 (2.4)
Hence for wb < g 1 q
q
the derivative of net private sector output with respect to the
bureaucratic wage rates is negative. Hence net output is higher with a wage that’s not
high enough to achieve a fully honest bureaucracy.
Hence it could be excessively costly to prevent all corruption and some corruption could
infact maximize net private sector output.
Q 2 D
The above proposition in our model explains that a small change in the wage (such that
we do not have all bureaucrats to be honest) will lead to a bigger saving in the cost of
employing bureaucrats than a bigger loss from some bureaucrats being corrupt. In Eq(2.4)
we see that if we wish to pay our bureaucrats just enough wage to make them honest then
our net private sector output will fall. Hence the savings by having the net private sector
output positive is much larger than the losses from paying a wage that makes all agents
working in the bureaucracy honest.
Flatters and Macleod (1995) study a model where a wage is chosen for the tax official by
the government while consideration that the agent may moonlight is given. The incentives
are set at a level to ensure that the government’s revenue target is met by the tax officials.
The authors find that corruption is a necessary part of the efficient solution. They give
two reasons for it. Firstly is the existence of constraints on the civil service wages. This
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could be in the form of some wage parity between the tax office and other government
offices or a wage ceiling for tax officials. Such wage constraints lead to the bribe taking
behavior of the civil servants. The second consideration they give is that the bribes act
like an unofficial commission to the tax collectors as they need to meet the revenue targets
of the government or face the consequences of being dismissed by the government. Since
a certain amount of effort is required from the tax officials to determine the tax liabilities
of the individual tax payer and to collect taxes from them. However the authors also
add that having ’accepted’ a level of corruption it is also important to be ensured that it
does not lead to deprivation of revenues for the government. They suggest that heavier
penalties must be imposed rather than simple dismissal
2.4.2 Concluding Comments
The paper explores a general equilibrium model to establish dynamics between private
sector wages and bureaucratic wage rates.
We identify; (1) The behavior of agents as we increase bureaucratic wages and private
sector wage rates, (2) We diagrammatically show the behavior of applicants to the bu-
reaucracy by changing private sector wages (by fixing each of the variables), (a) We then
change each of the variables and see its impact on the behavior of the applicants to the
bureaucracy, (3) The lowest possible bureaucratic wage rates that needs to be paid to
bureaucrats such that all are honest, (4) Even if the government is paying the lowest
possible wage rate, at this wage rate it is not possible to maximize net private sector
output. Hence the idea of maximization of net private sector output is not compatible
with maintaining an honest bureaucracy.
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2.5 Appendix
Proposition 1: When the opportunistic behavior of the dishonest bureaucrat goes unde-
tected (i.e.probability of being caught is zero) no-one working in the bureaucracy will be
honest. For q < g
wp+g
as there is increase in q the number of honest agents in the bureau-
cracy will increase, for q > g
wp+g
(where q ! 1 1) as there is increase in q the number of
honest agents in the bureaucracy will remain constant.
Proof:
We first establish results on the number of agents.
Bureaucrats would work honestly in the bureaucracy when the utility from being honest
and motivated is greater than what the agent gets if he is dishonest and works in the
bureaucracy i.e. (wb + θ) > (wb + θ + g)(1  q).
Lemma 1: We now prove the results on the private sector wages that for q < g
wp+g
as there
is increase in q the private sector wages will increase for q > g
wp+g
as there is increase in
q private sector wages will be constant.
Proof :
Segment A :
x̂ =
(
1 + wb + g   g
q
)
n
wp =
(
1 + wb + g   g
q
)
nαλg(1  n)α 1
∂wp
∂q
= g
q2
nαλg(1  n)α 1 > 0
As we increase q private sector wages will increase.
1We also explain in our proofs that wp > g
1−q
q for
dx
dq = 0, the inequality for private sector wages will
not hold true for q = 1
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Segment B:
x̂ = n
1+wb g( 1−q
q
)
1+wb+g  wp
1−q
∂wp
∂q
=  
g
q2
(1+wb+g)  wpg
q(1−q) (
1
q
+1)+ w
p
(1−q)2 (1+w
b)
(1+wb+g  wp
1−q )
2
1
(1+wb g( 1−q
q
))(1+wb+g  wp
1−q )
−2(1 q)−1 (αλg(1 n)α−1)−1) >
0
∂wp
∂q
< 0 for ∂x
∂q
> 0; ∂w
p
∂x
< 0 when (αλg(1  n)α 1) 1 < n(1 + wb   g(1 q
q
))(1 + wb + g  
wp
1 q )
 2(1  q) 1
which is the condition for a multiple equilibrium.
∂wp
∂q
> 0 for ∂x
∂q
> 0; ∂w
p
∂x
> 0 when (αλg(1  n)α 1) 1 > n(1 + wb   g(1 q
q
))(1 + wb + g  
wp
1 q )
 2(1  q) 1
which is the condition for a single equilibrium.
Segment C and Segment D
When q > g
wp+g
, ∂x
∂q
= 0 and ∂w
p
∂q
= ∂x
∂q
∂wp
∂x
= 0
Q 2 D
Proposition 2: If for a given slope of x as a function of wp as λ the unit benefit of a honest
bureaucrat on the private sector increases the private sector wages will increase (∂w
p
∂λ
> 0,
in this case we shall have a single equilibria )
If for a given slope of x as a function of wp, we have that as we increase λ the unit benefit
of a honest bureaucrat on the private sector the private sector wages will fall(s.t. we have
an inferior equilibrium where (∂w
p
∂λ
< 0)).
Proof:
Z = x̂(defined from Ls)-x̂ (defined from inverse wage line)  0)
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∂Z
∂wp
∂wp + ∂Z
∂λ
∂λ = 0
∂wp
∂λ
=   ∂Z∂wp∂Z
∂λ
∂wp
∂λ
= fn(slope of private sector wage line - slope of Ls function ) ∂Z
∂wp
In segment A, C and D we see that slope of private sector wage line > slope of Ls function
hence we have a single equilibria.
In segment B when slope of private sector wage line > slope of Ls function we have a
single equilibria and when slope of private sector wage line < slope of Ls function we have
an inferior equilibrium.
Segment A
x̂ =
(
1 + wb + g   g
q
)
n
Z = x̂(defined from Ls) - x̂ (defined from inverse wage line) 0)
wp =
(
1 + wb + g   g
q
)
nαλg(1  n)α 1
∂wp
∂λ
=
(
1 + wb + g   g
q
)
nαg(1  n)α 1 > 0
Segment B :
x̂ = n
1+wb g( 1−q
q
)
1+wb+g  wp
1−q
∂Z
∂wp
∂wp + ∂Z
∂λ
∂λ = 0
Using implicit form of equation we have: Z = x̂(defined from Ls) - x̂ (defined from inverse
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wage line) 0)
∂wp
∂λ
=   ∂Z∂wp∂Z
∂λ
∂Z
∂wp
= w
p
αλ2g(1 n)α−1
∂Z
∂λ
= (αλ g(1  n)α 1) 1   n(1 + wb   g(1 q
q
))(1 + wb + g   wp
1 q )
 2(1  q) 1
∂wp
∂λ
= w
p
αλ2g(1 n)α−1
1
(αλg(1 n)α−1)−1 n(1+wb g( 1−q
q
))(1+wb+g  wp
1−q )
−2(1 q)−1
The above derivative is positive given that:
(αλg(1  n)α 1) 1 > n(1 + wb   g(1 q
q
))(1 + wb + g   wp
1 q )
 2(1  q) 1
The above condition will give us a single equilibria.
If (αλg(1  n)α 1) 1 < n(1 + wb   g(1 q
q
))(1 + wb + g   wp
1 q )
 2(1  q) 1
holds the above derivative will be negative and it will give us an inferior equilibrium in
case we have a multiple equilibria.
Segment C
x = n
wp = nαλg(1  n)α 1
dwp
dλ
= αng(1  n)α 1 > 0
Since it is an increasing function as unit benefit λ increases the equilibrium private sector
wages will also increase.
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Segment D
x̂ = wb + 1  wp
wp = (wb + 1  wp)αλg(1  n)α 1
∂wp
∂λ
= (w
b+1)αg(1 n)α−1
(1+λαg(1 n)α−1)2 > 0
Q 2 D
Proposition 3 : As g increases, the allocation of resources to the bureaucracy the private
sector wages will increase if and only if (1+wb) > 2g 1 q
q
. As we further increase g private
sector wages will decrease for (1 + wb) > wp.
Proof:
Segment A:
x̂ =
(
1 + wb + g   g
q
)
n
∂Z
∂wp
∂wp + ∂Z
∂g
∂g = 0
Using implicit form of equation we have: Z = x̂ (defined from Ls) - x̂ (defined from
inverse wage line) 0)
∂wp
∂g
=  
∂Z
∂g
∂Z
∂wp
∂Z
∂wp
=   1
αλg(1 n)α−1
68
∂Z
∂g
= n  n
q
+ w
pg−2
αλ(1 n)α−1
∂wp
∂g
= n  n
q
+ w
pg−2
αλ(1 n)α−1
dwp
dg
> 0, given (1 + wb) > 2g 1 q
q
dwp
dg
< 0, given (1 + wb) < 2g 1 q
q
, in this case the shift in vertical Segment A is too close
to Y axis and hence there is a fall in private sector wages.
Segment B :
x̂ = n
1+wb g( 1−q
q
)
1+wb+g  wp
1−q
, then
∂Z
∂wp
∂wp + ∂Z
∂g
∂g = 0
Using implicit form of equation we have: Z = x̂(defined from Ls) - x̂ (defined from inverse
wage line) 0)
dwp
dg
=
n(1+wb−wp)
q
αgλ(1 n)α−1+w
p(1+wb+g− wp1−q )
2
g
n
1−q (1+w
b g 1−q
q
)αgλ(1 n)α−1 (1+wb+g  wp
1−q )
2
dwp
dg
< 0 when we have multiple equilibria, which holds when we have;
wp < (1 +wb) and (αλg(1  n)α 1) 1 < n(1 +wb   g(1 q
q
))(1 +wb + g   wp
1 q )
 2(1  q) 1
dwp
dg
> 0 when we have single equilibria, which holds when we have ;
wp > (1 +wb) and (αλg(1  n)α 1) 1 > n(1 +wb   g(1 q
q
))(1 +wb + g   wp
1 q )
 2(1  q) 1
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Segment C :
x̂ = n
∂x
∂g
= 0(x is independent of g)
dwp
dg
= αx(wb, wp, q, n)λ(1  n)α 1 > 0
Since dw
p
dg
is positive as g increases wp will increase in the segment
Segment D :
x̂ = wb + 1  wp(g) (x is not independent of g)
∂x
∂g
=  ∂wp
∂g
dwp
dg
=  α∂wp
∂g
gλ(1  n)α 1 + αx(wb, wp, g, q, n)λ(1  n)α 1 > 0
dwp
dg
is positive, hence as we increase g allocation of resources , private sector wages will
increase.
Q 2 D
2.5.1 Size of bureaucracy
In Fig(2.12) as we increase n, the number of honest agents in the bureaucracy would
increase and the private sector wages will also increase.
Proposition 4: When private sector wages are low , and hence working in the private
sector is unattractive, all workers prefer to be in public sector.
As we increase wb, s.t. 0  wp < g 1 q
q
the number of honest agents in the bureaucracy will increase till wp = g 1 q
q
(for θB =
wp   wb).
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Figure 2.12:
For wp < (wb + 1 − n), increasing bureaucratic wages the number of honest agents will
remain constant.
For wp > (wb + 1− n) the number of honest agents will increase.
As the bureaucratic wage rates increase the private sector wages will increase.
Proof :
First we demonstrate how honesty in the bureaucracy is affected by private sector wages
and bureaucratic wages.
Segment A :
x̂ =
(
1 + wb + g − g
q
)
n
∂x̂
∂wb
= n
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Here as we increase wb the number of honest agents in the bureaucracy will increase.
Segment B:
x̂ = n
1+wb g( 1−q
q
)
1+wb+g  wp
1−q
∂x̂
∂wb
= n
(
g
q
  wp
1 q
)
> 0
As we increase bureaucratic wages the number of honest agents will increase.
Segment C:
x̂ = n
Then, x̂ is independent of bureaucratic wage rates.
Segment D :
x̂ = wb + 1  wp(wb)
Then , ∂x̂
∂wb
= 1  αgλ(1  n)α 1 > 0
In this case we see that private sector wages are so high that it is attractive even to agents
with high motivation. The number of agents who would like to work in the bureaucracy
is less than those who would like to work in full size bureaucracy. But with an increase
in bureaucratic wages the number of honest agents will increase.
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We now show that as we increase bureaucratic wage rates private sector wages will in-
crease.
Segment A:
x̂ =
(
1 + wb + g   g
q
)
n
wp =
(
1 + wb + g   g
q
)
nαλg(1  n)α 1
∂wp
∂wb
= nαg(1  n)α 1 > 0
Segment B:
x̂ = n
1+wb g( 1−q
q
)
1+wb+g  wp
1−q
Using implicit form of equation we have
∂Z
∂wp
∂wp + ∂Z
∂wb
∂wb = 0
∂wp
∂wb
=
αλg(1 n)α−1−1 n(1+wb g 1−q
q
)(1+wb+g  wp
1−q )
−2(1 q)−1
n( g
q
  wp
1−q )
> 0
Hence as we increase bureaucratic wage rates private sector wages will increase.
Segment C:
x = n
In Segment C when there are all honest agents working in the bureaucracy private sector
wages are independent of bureaucratic wage rates.
Segment D:
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x̂ = wb + 1  wp
Using implicit form of equation we have
∂Z
∂wp
∂wp + ∂Z
∂wb
∂wb = 0
(where Z = x̂(defined from Ls) - x̂ (defined from inverse wage line) 0)
∂wp
∂wb
=  
∂Z
∂wb
∂Z
∂wp
∂wp
∂wb
=  
∂Z
∂wb
∂Z
∂wp
∂wp
∂wb
= 1
1+ 1
αλg(1−n)α−1
As we increase bureaucratic wage rates private sector wages will increase.
Q 2 D
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Chapter 3
Two State Story: Wage Contracts
and Profits under Competing
Government facing Competition
3.1 The Basic Model
Corruption models have been studied in a setup where there is a single government.
Verdier and Acemoglu (2000) in a single government setup discuss how investment is
affected by a large corrupt bureaucracy that is paid low as compared to a small honest
bureaucracy with some dishonest bureaucrats. Ackerman (1975) studies the relationship
between the officials and the market structures. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) study a
model where they have the bureaucrat as the monopolist of the good say the license,
providing permits. We however study corruption in a duopolistic regime where there are
two governments and a market for firms.
The economy consist of 2 regions (each of which has its own government) and continuum
of firms which have to take a decision to where to invest. The government of the 2
regions set p which is the royalty1 on producing a resource (the resource has a value
net of production cost of 1). The price charged on the royalty is inclusive of the sale of
1Government is selling a concession or a permit.
75
government good and part of after investment profits that the government would keep.
The firm would locate and invest in one of the regions. Firms are located along a line of
unit length with one government on each end. Firms are indexed by i, measured from
the end of the line at which government A is located. The government is the seller of
homogeneous product, with zero production cost.
Since the product is homogeneous, a customer will buy from the seller who quotes the
least price after transport cost. The transport cost is τ per unit distance.
We assume that the good is sold for the government by an official. The official can restrict
the quantity of the good that is sold (say he can deny the investor the investment license).
This denial might mean a long delay or an imposition of many requirements. It can be
assumed that the official will simply refuse to provide the good. The power to deny the
permits and regulations would give the officials the power to collect bribes in return for
providing the permits (De Soto, 1989).
The cost involved in issuing license is cost of having a bureaucracy or paying the bureau-
crats a wage rate wg (g=A,B).
We assume that the probability of meeting honest/dishonest bureaucrats is ha, 1   ha
respectively in the government serving Region A and hb, 1   hb respectively in the gov-
ernment serving the Region B.
The Model setup has resemblance to Hotelling (1929), with reference to each seller and
groups of buyers who will deal with him. The seller acts like a monopolist within his
region.
We distinguish our work from others on the basis of these following points 1) We have a
continuum of firms and two governments which decide to invest in either of the govern-
ments. The decision to invest in our model is dependent on transport cost, the number of
honest agents in the government and the bribe that the bureaucrat needs to pay. 2) We
do not distinguish our countries on the basis of natural endowments and natural resources
and we conclude that when both the governments serve then both the governments earn
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higher revenues. 3) In our model the Nash prices are dependent on transport cost, hence
the firm will have to pay a higher price if the transport cost are higher. 4) When govern-
ments collude then they choose higher corruption as when they are acting independently.
5) The governments decision to serve all firms or some firms is dependent on relation
between transport cost and honesty. We now discuss the literature to describe ways in
which our work differs from already existing work.
Emerson (2006) present a model where there is interaction between the corrupt gov-
ernment officials and the industrial firms where they show that corruption is negatively
related to competition. The government agent has a self interest, and it demands a bribe
which limit the number of firms and the number of firms that pay the bribe. The agents
rent collection ability is dependent on the number of “formal” firms. We can have mul-
tiple equilibrium where there is high corruption and low competition and other with low
corruption and high competition. The model describes that the firms invest in the govern-
ments, where the agent is in a position to demand a bribe. In equilibrium the firms pay
the bribe. The probability that the agent is detected and dismissed is a function of both
the level of bribe payment and the number of firms that are going to enter the market.
Hence the agent maximizes the expected revenues by taking bribes from the firms and by
choosing the level of bribe. Given we have a graph for the detection function, there are
multiple equilibria where one equilibrium has the characteristics of low competition and
high corruption and the other with high competition and low corruption. The empirical
evidence is in support that corruption and competition are negatively related. The lower
competitiveness in the economy arises due to the higher level of corruption existing in the
economy. In our model we have two governments competing against each other and there
is a market for firms. The firm has to locate and invest in one of these regions.The decision
to invest in our model is dependent on relation between transport cost and honesty.
Cai and Triesman (2005) study a model based on whether there is competition to attract
mobile capital. Competition for capital sometimes shifts the priorities away from non-
productive government activities towards business inducing investments. Rogoswki (2003)
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also finds that policies will diverge for two countries when there is mobility for capital.
Besley and Smart (2001) derive in their model that voter welfare will increase when there
is competition for capital however they do not take infrastructure into account. Cai and
Triesman (2005) study how capital competition affects tradeoff between public goods
and rents taken together and infrastructure. The authors conclude by saying that better
endowed countries in terms of natural resources, human capital or infrastructure tend
to drain out capital from poorly endowed economies. Centrally funded infrastructure
investments help in decentralized states poorly endowed regions to compete. Freeing
capital flows in unions like the European Union may help the disadvantaged countries to
grow. Our model does not take into account size of the country or differential in natural
endowments. We find that higher revenues are earned by both the governments when
they serve all firms.
Kanbur and Keen (1993) analyze a model where tax competition is unrestricted and the
borders are open. Each government (of the home country and the foreign country) be-
haves in a Nash manner where it chooses its tax rate to maximize the tax revenue. In
Nash equilibrium the amount of cross-border trading is independent of transport cost.
However in our model the Nash prices at which the government sells the royalty is depen-
dent on the transport cost. The increase in transport cost in their model has little effect
on cross-border shopping. The authors show a unique non-cooperative equilibrium where
the smaller country is charging a lower tax than the larger country.
In Section(3.2) we find that how wage contracts differ when we have independent or
collusive governments setting the same. In Section(3.3) we see the firms profits. and in
Section(3.4) we discuss the firms profits and then suggest policy choice.
Order of play
STAGE 1: Government sets a price p(royalty on producing a resource) and bureaucratic
wage rate wb. The bureaucratic wage rate wb is the fixed cost of the government incurred
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in maintaining a bureaucracy.
STAGE 2: Firm goes to the bureaucrat; ha are honest (1 ha are dishonest) in government
serving the region A and hb are honest (and 1  hb are dishonest) in government serving
the region B. The firm can’t change its mind when it finds that the bureaucrat is dishonest.
STAGE 3: If the firm meets the honest bureaucrat its payoff is 1  τi  pA, from region
A 1  τ(1  i)  pB from region B. If it meets a dishonest bureaucrat it will also have to
pay an arbitrary bribe b.
In our model the size of the public sector doesn’t depend on output, which would imply
that the size of bureaucracy doesn’t need to be proportional to size of private sector
in an economy. The profit function of the government and hence the wage it pays to its
bureaucrats is independent of the size of the private sector output. The surplus of the firm
would depend upon the probability with which the firm meets the dishonest bureaucrat.
The firm pays the bureaucrat a bribe b on top of prices it pays for buying the service.
We define i such that the firm is indifferent between buying a license from government
A or government B.
The government at A effectively offers firm i: 1  τi  pa   (1  ha)b
The government at B effectively offers firm i: 1  τ(1  i)  pb   (1  hb)b
1  τi   pa   (1  ha)b = 1  τ(1  i)  pb   (1  hb)b
i = bha bhb pa+pb+τ
2τ
The profit function for government A when the firm approaches it:
pia = pai
   wa
We differentiate with respect to pa and rearrange for the first order condition: pa =
bha bhb+pb+τ
2
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The profit function for government B when the firm approaches it:
pib = pb(1  i)  wb
pb =
 bha+bhb+pa+τ
2
The Nash equilibrium is given by :(pa, p

b) =
bha bhb+3τ
3
,  bha+bhb+3τ
3
We denote the net revenue of the government (or the government surplus as Π)
ΠA = pa(
1
2
+ b
6τ
(ha   hb))  wa
ΠB = pb(
1
2
+ b
6τ
(hb   ha))  wb
The calculated Nash equilibrium which are the prices at which the government would sell
the royalty to firm in our model and the net revenue of the firm both depend on honesty
of the agents in Government A and Government B. We model honesty as a function of
the bureaucratic wage rates.
We look at the wage setting for the bureaucrats in the bureaucracies. The wage contracts
for the employee is often incomplete since they take the form of a fixed wage contract,
without any explicit performance incentives and a considerable degree of workers discre-
tion over work effort (Fehr and Falk, 1999). We take the case of efficiency wages under
incomplete wage contract. Here the employer and in our case government rewards the
employee (the bureaucrat) for good performance (by putting in more effort) in the form
of efficiency wages. However we do not model efficiency wages explicitly but assume that
there is a relationship between wages and honesty.
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3.1.1 Government surplus dependent on Transport Cost
When we have symmetry in the model such that ha = hb then
δpi
δτ
is positive for ha = hb
(We prove in next section that we have symmetry in the model)
ΠA = (b
ha hb
3
+ τ)(1
2
+ b
6τ
(ha   hb))  wa
dΠA
dτ
=   b2
18(τ)2
(ha   hb)2 + 12
ΠB = (b
hb ha
3
+ τ)(1
2
+ b
6τ
(hb   ha)  wb
dΠB
dτ
=   b2
18(τ)2
(hb   ha)2 + 12
As τ increases by a unit then each government’s surplus increases by one-half, however
the Nash prices increase by a unit and each government sells to half of the firms.
As τ increases the government surplus will increase as the firm will have to have to pay
higher price for the royalty.
We look at the wage setting for the bureaucrats in the bureaucracies. The wage contracts
for the employee is often incomplete since they take the form of a fixed wage contract,
without any explicit performance incentives and a considerable degree of workers discre-
tion over work effort (Fehr and Falk, 1999). We take the case of efficiency wages under
incomplete wage contract. Here the employer and in our case government rewards the
employee (the bureaucrat) for good performance (by putting in more effort) in the form
of efficiency wages. However we do not model efficiency wages explicitly but assume that
there is a relationship between wages and honesty. In the following section we assume a
wage corruption relationship, however we do not explicitly derive this relationship using
the general equilibrium approach since we do so in the previous chapter.
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3.1.2 Efficiency Wages
We use an efficiency wage argument to make honesty an increasing concave function of
bureaucratic wage rates s.t. ha =
√
wa
W
(Where W is a constant and are the wages that
the bureaucrat can earn elsewhere) and hb =
√
wb
W
Proposition 1: The probability of meeting an honest agent is the same in both the bu-
reaucracies
Proof:
ΠA = (b
ha   hb
3
+ τ)(
1
2
+
b
6τ
(ha   hb))  wa (3.1)
ΠA = (b
ha hb
3
+ τ)(1
2
+ b
6τ
(ha   hb))  h2aW
ΠB = (
bhb   bha + 3τ
3
)(
1
2
+
b
6τ
(hb   ha))  wb (3.2)
ΠB = (
bhb bha+3τ
3
)(1
2
+ b
6τ
(hb   ha))  h2bW
We differentiate the government surplus of government A with respect to ha and solving
for ha we get:
ha =
b(bhb   3τ)
b2   18τW (3.3)
We have ha honest agents as the best response to hb honest agents in the other bureaucracy.
By the same procedure we get:
hb =
b(bha   3τ)
b2   18τW (3.4)
For ha honest agents in a bureaucracy we have hb honest agents in the other bureaucracy.
Solving the above symmetric equations for the Nash equilibrium we get :
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ha, hb = b
6W
,
b
6W
(3.5)
Substitute for ha and hb in ha =
√
wa
W
and hb =
√
wb
W
We get Nash Equilibrium as:
(wa, wb) = b236W , b
2
36W
Q 2 D
In the above proposition and proof we establish symmetric honesty in both the bureaucra-
cies, we now in the proposition below derive a relationship between surplus maximizing
wage rate and the efficiency bureaucratic wage rate.
Proposition 2: The surplus maximizing wage rate for the other government will fall as
the efficiency wage rates for the bureaucrats in the other bureaucracy increase s.t. the
following condition must hold: b2 < 18τW 2
Proof: Differentiating Equation(3.1) and Equation(3.2) w.r.t. wa and wb respectively we
get:
wa =
b2W (b
√
wb
W
  3τ)2
(b2   18τW )2 (3.6)
2b2 < 18τW
b2
18W < τ3 wa∗2 < τ
wa∗ = 2τ
There is a symmetric relationship between bureaucratic wage rates and transport cost when we have
symmetry.
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wb =
b2W (b
√
wa
W
  3τ)2
(b2   18τW )2 (3.7)
We plot the above two equations in the figure below (3.1) and we get point A which gives
an interior Nash Equilibrium and hence a solution for (wa, wb):
As we see in figure 3.1 we must also have dwa
dwb
< 0
dwa
dwb
= 2
b2W (b
p
wb
W
 3τ)
(b2 18τW )2
1
2
(
√
W
wb
) 1
W
) b√wb
W
< 3τ
b
√
wb
W
< 3τ
b2wb
W
< 9τ 2
wb
W
< 9 τ
2
b2
( b
6W
)2 < 9 τ
2
b2
The following condition that must be satisfied is: b2 < 18τW
Figure 3.1:
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3.2 Government collusion over wage rates
We have derived Nash equilibrium with incomplete labor contracts.
We prove in this section that under government collusion the Collusive wage rates are less
than the wage rates that are set by governments acting independently.
‘Honesty’ has a surplus increasing effect on bureaucratic wage rates (since dΠa
dha
> 0 and
dΠb
dhb
> 0 ). If honest agents of only one government increases the government surplus of
the other government will fall.
Πa = (b
1 (1 q)b+qwa hb
3
+ τ)(1
2
+ b
6τ
(1  (1  q)b+ qwa   hb))  wa
Πa
dhb
=   b
3
  2b2
18τ
(1  (1  q)b+ qwa   hb)
Πa
dhb
< 0
Similarly Πb
dha
< 0
Proposition 3: If the governments were to collude they would set a bureaucratic wage
rate much below than set by the government acting independently.
Proof:
piA + piB = Max[(b
ha   hb
3
+ τ)2
1
2τ
  h2aW + (b
hb   ha
3
+ τ)2
1
2τ
  h2bW ] (3.8)
∂pi
∂ha
=
1
τ
(b
ha   hb
3
+ τ)(
3
b
  3
b
)  2haW (3.9)
Therefore, ∂pi
∂ha
< 0
So when governments collude their government surplus is decreasing in honesty and there-
fore in wages. The governments agree to tolerate low h to save on the cost of reducing
corruption. The governments don’t henceforth want a honest bureaucracy. Implying that
they’ll pay their bureaucrats a low wage rate as well. As we see below the government
does not pay its bureaucrat any reservation wages.
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In Equation(3.8) we substitute for ha =
√
wa
W
differentiate and solve for wa.
Similarly we substitute for hb =
√
wb
W
differentiate and solve for wb.
We get:
(wa, wb) = b
4wa
(b2   9τW )2 ,
b4wb
(b2   9τW )2 (3.10)
Since wa = b4wa(b2 9τW )2 and wb = b
4wb
(b2 9τW )2 .
Since b2 6= b2   9τW , the only solution to this is that wa = wb = 0(we normalize the
wage rates here) in other words the government pays the lowest wage possible and have
no honest agents.
This however does not take account of the possibility that firms might prefer not to invest
when the level of dishonesty is too great, an issue we consider in the next section.
3.3 Firms’ profits
The firms are subject to a participation constraint such that their Πe  0
Πe = 1  τi   pa   (1  ha)b
The above Πe gives us profits of marginal firms where we assume i = 1
2
and hence all
firms are participating. We also substitute for prices in the above equation pie and we get:
pie = 1  τ 1
2
  bha hb
3
  τ   (1  ha)b
pie = 1  3
2
τ   (1  ha)b
From the above participation constraint we see that the firms decision to invest in a
given government is dependent on τ the unit cost of transportation that needs to be paid,
b bribe that firm pays if it meets a dishonest agent and ha are the number of honest agents.
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Firms are subject to the participation constraint such that pie  0 which implies (if we
are to have full participation with governments following the policies set out above):
1  3
2
τ   (1  ha)b > 0
For a given bribe we must have the following condition to hold on honesty:
ha >
3
2
τ
b
+ 1  1
b
Discussion
Fig(3.2) gives us the combinations for full participation (i = 1
2
) or in other words the
choice for participating firms when their decision to invest is dependent on h i.e. honesty
of the bureaucrats and τ the transport cost.
Each point on the two curves gives us full participation. For a given level of honesty the
flatter left hand line is for the case where the firm would have to pay a higher bribe and
therefore there is a lower willingness to pay high transport cost. Similarly for a given
level of honesty the steeper line is for the case when the firm is paying a lower bribe and
therefore has a higher willingness to pay a high transport cost. Full participation for high
transport cost is possible with high honesty. There is only one value of τ = (2
3
) where we
have a completely honest bureaucracy or (ha = 1) given by Point A in Fig(3.2). At point
A all agents are honest and the size of the bribe is irrelevant to any investment decision.
All firms invest only if τ  2
3
, shown as point A.
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Figure 3.2:
Fig(3.3) describes the investment decision for each marginal participating firm. LM and
OR gives us the profit curves for the firms. The profits for the firms are: (1   τi   pa)
at the intersection of the two curves at point A. If the firm has to pay for a dishonest
bureaucracy as well then we have an inward parallel shift of the curves s.t. they intersect
at point B s.t. we have 1   τ   pa   (1   ha)b. If the bribes increase then TP and DC
shifts inward. As the transport cost increases then the lines pivot inwards around their
vertical intercept(not shown in the diagram).
A decrease in ha and an increase in pa will shift the left line inward and a decrease in
hb and an increase in pb will shift the other line inward. The curves can shift inward
and hence the participation by ‘marginal participating firm’ will fall. The firms along the
segment FK will not participate.
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Figure 3.3:
3.4 Optimal Profit Path
Proposition 4: If both the government were to serve all firms the profit maximization
price would be higher than the profit maximization price where only a few firms would
be served.
Proof:
We discuss 2 cases:
Case 1 ) Some of the firms are served in this case i = 1 (1 ha)b pa
τ
Case 2) All of the firms are served, in this case i = bha bhb pa+pb+τ
2τ
Hence the sales function i when a single government serves wherein not all firms are
participating and when both the governments serve wherein all firms are participating is:
i = min(1 (1 ha)b pa
τ
, bha bhb pa+pb+τ
2τ
)
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The above sales function calculates the effect of sales for a single government and both
the governments’ w.r.t prices.
Case 1) di
dpa
(prices are such that only one government is serving)
=   1
τ
Case 2) di
dpa
(prices are such that both the governments are serving)=   1
2τ
In figure (3.4) at the kink point K the government at A is competing at the margin with
government B. So the marginal firm has zero profits with either of the governments.
The firms sales are shown in figure (3.4). For high prices, the marginal firm served by
the government A has zero profits and is choosing whether or not to participate. At the
kink point K the marginal firm would also have zero profits if it went to government B.
For lower prices, all firms will participate and government A’s marginal firm is choosing
which government to patronize. This part of the graph has a slope twice as steep as the
upper part.
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Figure 3.4:
In fig (3.5) we see that at the kink point the two curves intersect at the point k , the kink
point k is given by equating
1 (1 ha)b pa
τ
= bha bhb pa+pb+τ
2τ
From the above equation we get: 1  b  bha   pa = bha2   bhb2   pa2 + pb2 + τ2
pa = 2  2b+ bha + bhb   pb   τ
Hence at the kink point we have the above price pk
pa + pb = 2  2b+ bha + bhb   τ (3.11)
We now want to find the profit-maximizing prices in each of the two cases:
Case 1: When not all firms are served:
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pia = pa(
1 (1 
p
wa
W
)b pa
τ
)  wa
Differentiate the above profit function w.r.t pa and solve for pa to get:
pa =
b
√
wa
W
  b+ 1
2
(3.12)
Case 2: When all firms are served:
piA = pa(
b
p
wa
W
 bhb pa+pb+τ
2τ
)  wa
Differentiate the above profit function w.r.t pa and solve for pa to get:
pa =
b
√
wa
W
  bhb + pb + τ
2
(3.13)
Discussion:
In fig (3.5) we have two profit curves OKE and OKC. The two curves intersect at point
K. At the kink point K there is a change in behavior of the firms. Before the kink point
K on the profit curve OKE for low prices there is participation by all firms (on the solid
line OK) and after the kink point K for higher prices not all firms participate.
Point K also gives us the equilibrium point which is also the kink point. At point K we
also have maximization of profits for the government when it does not serve all firms,
which would lie on the optimal profit path OKE.
When there is an increase in prices in our model (we could also think about it like taxes in
tax competition literature) then there is an increase in exodus of firms from the market,
we find that it is more optimal for only a single government to serve or sell royalties.
At K we have profit maximization for the firms such that;
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We have for a single government:
piA = pa(
1  (1  ha)b  pa
τ
)  wa (3.14)
Now dpia
dpa
= 1 (1 ha)b 2pa
τ
= 0
2pa = 1  (1  ha)b
pa =
1  b(1  ha)
2
(3.15)
At K we must have profits of both the governments increasing when they sell royalties to
all participating firms s.t on OK part of the curve we have:
piA = pa(
b
√
wa
W
  bhb   pa + pb + τ
2τ
)  wa (3.16)
∂pi
∂pa
= b(ha hb) 2pa+pb+τ
2τ
Now ∂pi
∂pa
> 0 if 2pa < b(ha   hb) + pbk + τ
Substituting in the above equation for pb at the kink point we have:
pa <
2
3
(1  b(1  ha)) (3.17)
At KE part of the curve we have:
piA = pa(
1  (1  ha)b  pa
τ
)  wa (3.18)
Now dpia
dpa
= 1 (1 ha)b 2pa
τ
< 0
2pa > 1  (1  ha)b
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pa >
1  b(1  ha)
2
(3.19)
Figure 3.5:
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We construct in the above section profit curves when all firms are participating and when
all firms are not participating. We see that the profit maximization price on the curve
where not all firms participate is also the kink price , where the kink price stands for
a change in behavior for the firms. As beyond the kink price all firms do not want to
participate. However it may not be the best outcome for the government to change its
behavior at the profit maximization prices, we see in the section below what the best
outcome for the governments are. Q 2 D
3.4.1 Best Outcomes for Governments
We see in this section that the government can decide when to serve all firms and when
not to which is dependent on the transport cost.
The Governments do not serve all firms in this case the profit function is:
piA = pa(
1  (1  ha)b  pa
τ
)  wa (3.20)
Now dpia
dpa
= 1 (1 ha)b 2pa
τ
Substituting dpia
dpa
= 0 we have:
2pa = 1  (1  ha)b
At profit maximization prices we have:
3pNa =
1  b(1  ha)
2
(3.21)
From Eq (3.11) we have
pa + pb = 2  2b+ bha + bhb   pb   τ
pka + p
k
b = 2  2(1  h)b  τ
Now we assume that ha = hb = h and pa = pb
3we denote these prices when not all firms are served
95
pka = 1  (1  h)b 
τ
2
(3.22)
From Eq (3.21) and Eq (3.22) we see that if: τ < 1 (1 h)b
2
Then pka > p
N
a i.e. the kink prices are greater than the profit maximization prices.
In fig (3.6) point A gives us the kinked price beyond which not all firms participate, point
Q is the profit maximization price.
Figure 3.6:
From Eq (3.21) and Eq (3.22) we see that if: τ > 1 (1 h)b
2
Then pka < p
N
a i.e. the kink prices are less than the profit maximization prices.
In fig (3.7) point A gives us the kinked price beyond which not all firms participate, point
Q is the profit maximization price.
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Figure 3.7:
The Governments want to serve all firms in this case the profit function is:
piA = pa(
b
p
wa
W
 bhb pa+pb+τ
2τ
)  wa
Differentiate the above profit function w.r.t pa and solve for pa to get:
pa =
b
√
wa
W
  bhb + pb + τ
2
(3.23)
Assume pa = pb and ha = hb = h
From Eq(3.23) we get: 2pa   pb = τ
4pAa = τ (3.24)
from Eq (3.22) we have:
4we denote these prices when all firms are served
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pk = 1  (1  ha)b  τ2
If τ < 1 (1 h)b
2
pAa <
1  (1  h)b
2
< pk (3.25)
If τ > 1 (1 h)b
2
pk <
1  (1  h)b
2
< pAa (3.26)
3.4.2 Policy Choice
When τ < 1 (1 h)b
2
;
Both the governments are directly competing against each other5 the price at which the
profits are maximized for a single government is equal to the prices at which the profits
are maximized for both the governments.
When transport cost are low the governments set low prices for selling royalties. It is
not optimal for any of the governments to increase the price since with a higher price the
marginal firm that is served by the government A will have zero profits and will choose
whether to participate or not to participate. In Fig (3.8) we see that at point Q which is
the profit maximization price where all firms are participating pAA = p
N
A . At KE part of
the optimal curve OQE not all firms participate.
5Proof in the appendix
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Figure 3.8:
When τ > 1 (1 h)b
2
;
With high transport cost the governments would set a high price if all firms are served
and that would mean that some firms don’t enter. A higher transport cost, and higher
honesty would mean higher price and higher profits. Both the governments are not directly
competing as some firms are unserved. In Fig(3.9)on the curve OKE, at KE part of the
curve not all firms participate.
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Figure 3.9:
3.4.3 Concluding Comments
The paper explores wage contracts in corruption model when we have competing gov-
ernments facing corruption. Government sets a price for the royalty and maximizes its
profits on selling the royalty, that is still consistent with all firms participating. When the
transport cost are low, government sets a low level of honesty leading to high corruption.
When the transport cost are high, then buying royalties from the governments such that
governments profits are maximized will drive away firms from the market. This is a conse-
quence of the governments objective function concentrating solely on profits. Corruption
in this case will be low. We could possibly extend our model in two ways 1) The argument
can be that in a non-linear utility model where the agent who receives a higher wage may
substitute high effort for low effort in the allocation of licenses (which our model does not
accommodate for). The agent who receives a higher wage may devote less effort, however
the honest agent who receives a higher wage will always sell a lower number of licenses as
compared to the dishonest agent since the dishonest agent earns a bribe on each permit
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(see Gioacchino and Maurizio (2008), pp. 296). The pure income effect generated by our
linear utility model will however not change the results of the model. 2) We introduce
the possibility of extortion in our model by firms on corrupted bureaucrats (such that
firm has to pay a certain amount of money to get the licenses). In this case we see that
decision to invest by the firm will no longer just depend on honesty of the agent and
hence the bureaucratic wage rate that is given to the agent. Introducing the possibility
of extortion can determine the decision to invest for the firms right from the beginning
of the game as the firm will now invest in the government where it doesn’t need to pay a
higher extortion fee.
3.5 Final Concluding Comments
We explore a general equilibrium model to establish the dynamics between the private
sector wages and the bureaucratic wages. We have identified the behavior of the agents as
we increase bureaucratic wage rates and private sector wages. We also diagrammatically
show the behavior of the applicants to the bureaucracy by changing the private sector
wages. We show that at the lowest possible bureaucratic wage rates that are paid to
the bureaucrats it is not possible to maximize net private sector output and maintain
an honest bureaucracy. In Chapter 2 we explore wage contracts in corruption model
when we having competing governments facing corruption. Government sets a price for
the royalty and maximizes its profits on selling the royalty, that is still consistent with
all firms participating. When the transport cost are low, government sets a low level
of honesty leading to high corruption. When the transport cost are high, then buying
royalties from the governments such that governments profits are maximized will drive
away firms from the market. This is a consequence of the governments objective function
concentrating solely on profits. Corruption in this case will be low. We would like to take
forward our research on the models proposed above.
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3.6 Appendix
We prove in the appendix that when τ < 1 (1 h)b
2
then the governments serve all firms
where the firms are directly competing against each other.
When all the firms are being served we have the profit function to be:
piA = pa(
b
p
wa
W
 bhb pa+pb+τ
2τ
)  wa
Differentiating and solving for wa we get :
wa =
b2p2a
16Wτ2
, ha =
bpa
4Wτ
Hence we get the transport cost as: τ = bpa
4Wha
Therefore: τ < b
4Wha
(1 (1 ha)b
2
)
(Since b
4Wha
< 1)
Hence we prove that when the governments’ do not collude then τ < 1 (1 ha)b
2
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